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I. REMOVAL JURISDICTION IN GENERAL
Subject to certain exceptions, a defendant may remove "any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction ... "' The rationale for removal jurisdiction is the be-
lief that defendants, as well as plaintiffs, should have the opportunity to
benefit from the availability of a federal forum.' For example, traditionally,
removal in diversity cases was intended to ensure a neutral forum for alien
defendants when a plaintiff sued in his or her home state.3 In federal ques-
tion cases, removal has customarily ensured that questions of federal law
were decided by judges more familiar with those issues.4
Today, employers generally seek to remove employment cases to fed-
eral court, not only to benefit from federal judges' neutrality or familiarity
with the federal statutes, but also to take advantage of practical and strategic
advantages not available in state court.5 In recent years, removal by employ-
ers has increased, possibly in part due to defendants' penchant for seeking a
federal forum, but more likely because plaintiffs have many more opportuni-
ties to file their employment-related claims in state courts. This is largely
because states such as Florida have in recent years enacted legislation similar
to federal anti-discrimination laws, and often providing for greater coverage
or relief.6
With the proliferation of removal efforts comes the need for courts to
focus on the broad jurisdictional issues as well as the intricacies of removal
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000). See also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 §12, 1 Stat. 79-
80 (original removal statute).
2. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §5.5, at 340 (3d ed. 1999).
3. See CHEMERINSKY,Supra note 2.
4. See Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Paul J.
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 170-76
(1953)).
5. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 826 (1990) ("It may be
assumed that federal judges will have more experience in Title VII litigation than state judges.
That, however, is merely a factor . . . that may motivate a defendant to remove a case to fed-
eral court.").
6. For example, the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, unlike Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, extends protection to "marital status" discrimination and does not limit
the amount of available compensatory damages. See FLA. STAT. § 760.01-.11 (2002).
[Vol. 28:2:351
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 14
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss2/14
REMOVAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES
procedures.7 Accordingly, case law addressing the minutiae of removal ju-
risdiction and procedures has exploded in recent years. The purpose of this
article is to review and analyze developments and trends in the recent deci-
sions relating to removal procedures and jurisdictional prerequisites, particu-
larly those impacting employment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit.
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
The general removal statute does not separately provide jurisdiction;"
rather, a defendant may only remove an action if the federal court would
possess original jurisdiction over the subject matter.9 In general, the com-
plaint must be either be a federal question or a diversity of citizenship must
exist for a case to be removed pursuant to section 1441(a)."0 Because re-
moval jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, "removal statutes
should be construed narrowly, with doubts resolved against removal."' '
Thus, the party seeking removal to federal court has the burden of establish-
ing federal jurisdiction.' 2
Federal courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising un-
der the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."' 3 If federal ques-
tion jurisdiction exists, an action "shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties."'
' 4
B. Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
The presence of federal question jurisdiction has traditionally been gov-
erned by the "well-pleaded complaint" rule.'5 Pursuant to this rule, a case
"arises under" federal law, and is therefore removable, only if a federal claim
7. See Matthew C. Lucas, Trial Lawyers Forum: Diversity Jurisdiction Removal In
Florida, 77 FLA. BAR J. 54, (2003) (stating "[A] maelstrom of potential issues - - from the
mundane to the occasionally esoteric - - await the practitioner who seeks to remove a lawsuit
from a Florida court to a federal court .... ).
8. See Allen v. Christenberry, 327 F.3d 1290, 1296 n.3 (1 I th Cir. 2003).
9. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Field v. Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., No. 8:00-CV-989-T-24TBM, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5451, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22,
2001).
10. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, §5.5, at 340 (3d ed. 1999).
11. Allen, 327 F.3d at 1293 (citing Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir.
1996); see Univ. ofS. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405,411 (1lth Cir. 1999).
12. See Diaz, 85 F.3d at 1505.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
15. Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Williams, 482 U.S.
at 392; Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
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exists on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. 6 In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit
reaffirmed that the federal question must "'necessarily appear [ ] in the plain-
tiffs statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by any-
thing alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the
defendant may interpose." 
7
The United States Supreme Court has established that "[a] defense is
not part of a plaintiffs properly pleaded statement of his or her claim."' 8
Thus, "a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal
defense... even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs complaint, and
even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue
in the case."' 9
C. Complete Preemption - Exception to the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Generally, the defense of ordinary preemption-that the plaintiffs state
law claims have been substantively displaced by federal law-has been held
to be insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction.20 In 2003, the Supreme
Court, in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,"' decided that "a state claim
may be removed to federal court [under federal question jurisdiction based
on preemption] in only two circumstances-when Congress expressly so
provides, such as in the Price-Anderson Act ...when a federal statute
wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-
16. Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475-76 (quoting Williams, 482 U.S. at 392; See also Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (stating "[i]t is long settled law that a cause of ac-
tion arises under federal law only when the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint raises issues of
federal law."); Whitt v. Sherman Int'l Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1329 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (stating
"[a] case does not arise under federal law unless a federal question is presented on the face of
the plaintiff's complaint.").
17. Stem v. IBM, 326 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989))(quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-
76 (1914); (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908))).
18. Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475. "[P]reclusion thus remains a defensive plea involving no
recasting of the plaintiffs complaint, and is therefore not a proper basis for removal." Id. at
477.
19. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1,
14(1983).
20. See Caterpillar Inc., v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1987) "The fact that a de-
fendant might ultimately prove that a plaintiffs claims are pre-empted ... does not establish
that they are removable to federal court." Id. at 398. Ordinary preemption is a defense that
may be raised in state court as well as in federal court. See BLAB T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v.
Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 855 (11 th Cir. 1999).
21. 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003).
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emption. ' 22  Unlike the defense of ordinary preemption, the doctrine of
"complete preemption" gives a defendant the ability to remove the case to
federal court. 23 The rationale undergirding this exception is that, where fed-
eral preemption is so complete that conflicting state law not only must yield,
but is effectively extinguished; the only theory of recovery remaining is the
federal claim, which takes the place of the state law claim recited in the
complaint.24
Accordingly, complete preemption is an "extremely narrow excep-
,,21tion, which only exists where Congress has clearly manifested an intent to
make causes of action under a federal statute removable to federal court.26 In
fact, until the Anderson decision in June 2003, the Supreme Court has in-
voked the complete preemption doctrine under only two statutes, the Labor
management Relations Act ("LMRA") and Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"). 27 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has refused to
extend the complete preemption doctrine beyond the LMRA or ERISA.28
For example, in Geddes v. American Airlines Inc.,2 9 the Eleventh Circuit in
2003 refused to extend the doctrine of complete preemption to state actions
implicating the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). 30 The court reasoned that the
Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant "to find complete preemption
absent any indication of Congress' clear intent to establish federal question
22. Id. at 2063. See generally Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63-65. "On occasion, the Court has
concluded that the pre-emptive force of a statute is so 'extraordinary' that it 'converts an ordi-
nary common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded
complaint rule."' Williams, 482 U.S. at 393 (citing Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65).
23. See BLAB T.V., 182 F.3d at 854.
24. See Anderson, 123 S. Ct. at 2063 (stating"[w]hen the federal statute completely pre-
empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of
action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.").
25. Stern, 326 F.3d at 1371 .
26. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 67.
27. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735 Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
390 U.S. 557, 559 (1967) (providing an example of complete pre-emption under the LMRA),
and Taylor, 481 U.S. at 67 (stating "[t]his [ERISA] suit, though it purports to raise only state
law claims, is necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of
Congress.").
28. See Anderson v. H & R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1046-48 (11 th Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing that the National Bank Act did not accomplish complete preemption), rev'd, sub nom.,
Anderson, 123 S. Ct. at 2063; Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1310-13 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the Federal Communications Act did not accomplish complete preemption);
BLAB T. V., 182 F.3d at 857-59 (holding that the Cable Communications Policy Act did not
accomplish complete preemption).
29. 321 F.3d 1349 (11 th Cir. 2003).
30. Id. at 1356-57.
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jurisdiction . . . . ,,3' The court concluded that although the RLA was de-
signed to provide a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes, it
lacked express language creating a federal cause of action (unlike ERISA or
the LMRA).32
However, subsequent to Geddes, the Supreme Court in Anderson ex-
tended the complete preemption doctrine to hold that two sections of the
National Bank Act completely preempted certain state law claims.33 Ander-
son potentially expands the scope of the complete preemption doctrine and
will be discussed in greater depth in Section IV, infra. Additionally, the
Eleventh Circuit recently refined the application of the complete preemption
doctrine under ERISA.34 These developments will also be discussed at
greater length in Section IV.
D. Diversity Jurisdiction
The diversity statute confers jurisdiction on the federal courts in civil
actions between citizens of different states, in which the jurisdictional
amount of greater than $75,000 is met, exclusive of interest and costs. 35 As
the Eleventh Circuit held in 2002, according to the rule of "complete diver-
sity," no plaintiff may share the same state citizenship with any defendant.36
In 2002, the Eleventh Circuit, in Leonard v. Enterprise Rent a Car,37
held that for purposes of challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court, the critical time is the date of removal. 38 The court held that
"[i]f jurisdiction was proper at that date, subsequent events, even the loss of
the required amount in controversy, will not operate to divest the court of
jurisdiction. 39
31. Id. at 1357.
32. Id. See also Selim v. Pan American Airways Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1320
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding Airline Deregulation Act does not completely preempt state law
claims sufficient to support removal jurisdiction). But see Solimo v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R., 253 F. Supp. 2d 733, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding state law claims that could not be
settled without reference to CBA were preempted by the RLA).
33. Anderson, 123 S. Ct.. at 2060-63.
34. See Ervast v. Flexible Prods. Co., No. 02-15769, 02-15941, 2003 WL 22203472, at
*4 (11 th Cir. Sept. 24, 2003).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2000).
36. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, 292 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11 th Cir. 2002).
37. 279 F.3d 967 (11 th Cir. 2002).
38. Id. at 972 (citing Poore v. American-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Texas, 218 F.3d 1287,
1289-91 (11 th Cir. 2000)).
39. Id. See also Jones v. Law Firm of Hill & Ponton, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1355 (M.D.
Fla. 2001) (stating "if there is no diversity of citizenship as of the date of commencement of
[Vol. 28:2:351
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1. Complete Diversity
The Supreme Court has established that a case falls within the federal
district court's "original" diversity jurisdiction only if diversity of citizenship
among the parties is "complete" (e.g., only if there is no plaintiff and no de-
fendant who are citizens of the same state).40 Consequently, a defendant
cannot remove a case that contains some claims against diverse defendants as
long as there is one claim brought against a nondiverse defendant. 4' In other
words, as the Northern District of Florida recently explained, "actions cannot
be removed based on diversity if any defendant is a citizen of the forum
state. '42
The courts are still divided over the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. §
1441(b) allows removal of a diversity action before a non-diverse defendant
is served. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), as amended, provides: "[S]uch action[s]
shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.' '43 The Northern District of Florida has stated that "a plaintiff can-
not defeat removal merely by naming a non-diverse defendant; that defen-
dant also has to be 'properly joined and served' for removal to be barred. 44
Despite the language of section 1441(b), some courts have continued to
follow the pre-amendment Supreme Court decision in Pullman Co. v. Jen-
kins,45 which established that the presence of a single non-diverse defendant,
whether served or not, defeats removal jurisdiction.46 The Eleventh Circuit
action, it cannot be created by a subsequent change of domicile by one of the parties.") (citing
Slaughter v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 359 F.2d 954 (5th cir. 1966)).
40. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990). But cf FED. R. Civ. P. 21;
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832-38 (1989) (Rule 21 authorizes
courts to dismiss nondiverse defendants in order to cure jurisdictional defects, instead of the
entire case).
41. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
42. Bouie v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1262 n.4 (N.D.
Fla. 2002).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
44. Samples v. Conoco, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1308 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (quoting Gil-
berg v. Stepan Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (D.N.J. 1998)). See also Mask v. Chrysler Corp.,
825 F. Supp. 285, 289 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (stating "the case was properly removed because the
[non-diverse] dealer has not been served"), affd 29 F.3d 641 (11 th Cir. 1994).
45. 305 U.S. 534, 539-41 (1939).
46. See Everett v. MTD Prods., 947 F. Supp. 441, 444 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (stating "Pull-
man continues to be good law to this day."); Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys "R" Us,
Inc., No. 02-CIV-0808(GEL), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6502, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003)
(stating "It is well established that an action based on state law cannot be removed to federal
court if any non-diverse defendant is joined in the complaint, regardless of whether that de-
fendant has been served.").
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has not resolved this issue, although, in dicta it did express that "[u]nserved
resident fictitious defendants may not be ignored on removal if the com-
plaint's allegations are directed at all defendants jointly ....
2. Individuals
For diversity jurisdiction purposes, an individual can be a citizen of
only one state at a time.48 State citizenship, or "domicile," is determined by
two factors: residence and intent to remain. 49 Generally, individuals are
citizens of the state in which they maintain a principal residence, however,
courts will look to the "totality of evidence., 5' Accordingly, one court has
recently denied removal where the defendant alleged only "residence," as
opposed to "citizenship."
51
Various issues continue to arise as to where an individual is domiciled
for purposes of diversity. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has recently
held that aliens who have not yet established legal permanent residence are
not citizens of the United States or Florida for purposes of diversity. 52 Fur-
thermore, a member of the military service is presumed to retain his domicile
at the time of enlistment.53 Likewise, "'out-of-state college students are tem-
porary residents and not domiciliaries of the states in which they attend col-
lege."' 54 "Generally, a minor's domicile is determined by reference to that of
some other person. In most cases, the minor's father's domicile."55 Finally,
diversity of citizenship in a putative class action is determined by the citizen-
ship of the class members rather than the citizenship of the class representa-
tives.
56
47. Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11 th Cir. 1983); overruled by Wilson
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 782 (11 th. Cir. 1989).
48. Jones, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1353-54.
49. Id. at 1355.
50. Id.
51. Johnson v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 03 CIV 4891 (LAK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12491, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003).
52. See Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman & Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir.
1997).
53. Deckers v. Kenneth W. Rose, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 25, 27 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
54. Las Vistas Villas, S.A. v. Petersen, 778 F. Supp. 1202, 1205 (M.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd,
13 F.3d 409 (1 1th Cir. 1994), (quoting Hakkila v. Consol. Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc. 745 F.
Supp. 988, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
55. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Mirczak, 662 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (D. Nev. 1987);
Wilson v. Kimble, 573 F. Supp. 501, 502 (D. Colo. 1983); Fahmer v. Gentzsch, 355 F. Supp.
349, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Pauley v. Pauley, 58 F.R.D. 386, 387 (D. Md. 1972).
56. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969).
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3. Corporations
Diversity citizenship is frequently debated in employment related cases
because many employers are corporations with headquarters or operations
outside the place of employment. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that,
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of: 1) the
state in which it is incorporated; and 2) the state where it has its principal
place of business. 7
4. State of Incorporation
[T]he requirement that "a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of
any State by which it has been incorporated" refers to the state in
which the appropriate regulatory agency has issued a certificate of
incorporation or other legal document signifying that the corpora-
tion has been properly established pursuant to that state's law, and
that no further inquiry is appropriate.
8
Failure to maintain good standing in a state of its incorporation is irrele-
vant.59
Where a corporation is incorporated in more than one state, most courts
have concluded that the multi-state corporation is deemed a citizen of every
state in which it has been incorporated.6" However, some courts, applying
the so-called "forum doctrine," hold that a defendant multi-state corporation,
when sued in one of the states of its incorporation, is regarded for diversity
purposes as a citizen only of the forum state.6
Furthermore, pursuant to the alter ego and consolidation doctrines, a
corporation may gain additional places of citizenship for purposes of diver-
sity jurisdiction if it is consolidated with another corporation, or if it is found
to be the "alter ego" of another corporation.62 "For example, when a subsidi-
ary is the alter ego of a parent, the parent is deemed to be a citizen of (1) the
place where it is incorporated, (2) the place where its subsidiary is incorpo-
57. Bel-Bel Int'l Corp. v. Cmty. Bank of Homestead, 162 F.3d 1101, 1106 (1 1th Cir.
1998); (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994)); Fritz v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 751 F.2d
1152, 1153 (11 th Cir. 1985) (stating "Thus, the statute [28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)] furnishes a dual
base for citizenship: place of incorporation, and principal place of business.").
58. Fritz, 751 F.2d at 1154.
59. See Smith v. Arundel Coop., Inc., 660 F. Supp. 912, 913 (D.D.C. 1987).
60. See e.g., Yancoskie v. Del. River Port Auth., 528 F.2d 722, 727 n. 17 (3d Cir. 1975).
61. See Hudak v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 238 F. Supp. 790, 791-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
62. Panalpina Welttransport GmBh v. Geosource, Inc., 764 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Freeman v. Northwest Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1985)).
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rated, and (3) the place where it has its principal place of business."63 How-
ever, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the alter ego doctrine cannot be used
to preserve diversity jurisdiction by ignoring the place of incorporation of the
subsidiary and treating the subsidiary as if it were only a citizen of the state
of incorporation of the dominant corporation.'
5. Principal Place of Business
A more frequently litigated issue is the location of a corporation's
"principal place of business." It is clear "that a corporation can have only
one principal place of business."65 The Eleventh Circuit has held that, "[i]n
determining a corporation's principal place of business, a district court must,
consider all of the corporation's operations. ...""
One looks to the "total activity" of the corporation in order to de-
termine its principal place of business. This analysis incorporates
both the "place of activities" test (focus on production or sales ac-
tivities), and the "nerve center" test (emphasis on the locus of the
managerial and policymaking functions of the corporation).67
"[A] foreign corporation is a citizen of the U.S. state where it has its
principal place of business. 68
6. Unincorporated Associations
An unincorporated association is a citizen of every state where one of
its members is a citizen. 69 Accordingly, a limited partnership is a citizen of
each state in which at least one of its general or limited partners is a citizen.7°
63. Id.
64. See Fritz, 751 F.2dat 1153.
65. Brandt v. Weather Channel, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 1999); (citing
citing Vareka lnvs., N.V. v. Am. Inv. Prop., Inc., 724 F.2d 907 (1 1th Cir. 1984)).
66. Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
67. Vareka Invs., N.V. 724 F.2d at 910, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). See also
Bivens v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D244
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2000).
68. Las Vistas Villas, S.A. v. Petersen, 778 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (citing
Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31 (5th Cir., 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946
(1982)), aff'd, 13 F.3d 409 (1992).
69. United Steelworkers of Am. v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 146 (1965).
70. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 191-95 (1990). Cf Riley v. Merrill
Lynch, 292 F.3d 1334, 1339 (1 1th Cir.) (holding a business trust is a citizen of each state in
which one of its shareholders is a citizen), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950 (2002).
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Likewise, a labor union is a citizen of every state where one of its members
is a citizen.7'
7. National Banks
National banks are subject to different diversity jurisdiction require-
ments.72 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1348, national banks not chartered by any state
are deemed citizens of the states in which they are located.73 Accordingly,
some courts have held that a national bank is "located" in every state in
which it has a branch, therefore diversity jurisdiction will rarely be avail-
able.74 However, the Seventh Circuit has recently held that national banks
are subject to citizenship determinations similar to that of traditional corpora-
tions,75 therefore, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a national bank is
deemed to be a citizen of two states, the state of its principal place of busi-
ness and the state listed in its organization certificate. 76 Although the Elev-
enth Circuit has not resolved the issue, one district court within the Circuit
has followed the Seventh Circuit reasoning.77
8. Amount in Controversy - What Is and Is Not Included
It is clear that in determining whether the $75,000 jurisdictional thresh-
old is met, the court must look solely to the amount in controversy at the
time of removal.78 Any subsequent events that may reduce the amount in
controversy will not divest the court of jurisdiction.79
[D]etermination of the value of the matter in controversy for pur-
poses of federal jurisdiction is a federal question to be decided un-
der federal standards, although the federal courts must, of course,
71. See United Steelworkers, 382 U.S. at 152-53.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1348.
73. See Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276 (1925).
74. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. lacono, 785 F. Supp. 30, 33 (D.R.I. 1992).
75. Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 2001).
76. See id.
77. Evergreen Forest Prods. of Ga. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1303
(M.D. Ala. 2003) (adopting Faul, "[h]owever, rather than using a national bank's original
organizational certificate as the second component in the citizenship determination, this court
believes that a bank's most recent articles of association provide a more accurate standard for
determining a bank's current citizenship."). Id.
78. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993).
79. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
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look to state law to determine the nature and extent of the right to
be enforced in a diversity case.
8°
9. Actual Damages
In evaluating whether the amount in controversy requirement is satis-
fied, courts will look to a plaintiffs claim for actual damages.8' In employ-
ment cases, lost wages, bonuses, and benefits may be used in establishing the
amount in controversy.82
For example, in George v. Marriott Senior Living Services, Inc.,83 plain-
tiff asserted a claim for age discrimination under the FCRA. 84 "In her com-
plaint, plaintiff alleged that her damages 'exceed Fifteen Thousand Dollars'
but did not otherwise provide any specific numerical calculation of damages
sought in the action."85 In response to interrogatories, plaintiff did not pro-
vide a dollar amount of damages but did state that she was "seeking damages
in the form of lost wages, lost bonuses, attorney's fees, loss of benefits, and
unspecified compensatory damages for pain and suffering."86 In its notice of
removal, defendant, based upon these interrogatory answers, calculated the
probable measure of damages, including back wages, as exceeding
$75,000.87 The southern district held that, based upon these calculations,
defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that as of the date of
removal, plaintiffs complaint and other documentation indicated that the
amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.88
Both "potential as well as past damages are appropriate for considera-
tion."89 However, in Golden v. Dodge-Markham Co,.9" a case involving a
claim for retaliatory discharge pursuant to Florida's Whistleblower Act, the
court remanded in part on the basis that "[a]t the time of removal, Plaintiffs
80. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1961).
81. See Pease v. Medtronic, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
82. See Viens v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 3:96cv02602 (AHN), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24029, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 1997) (including reasonably probable lost wages and
medical expenses).
83. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22822 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *3.
87. George, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22822 at *3.
88. Id. at *5.
89. Viacom, Inc. v. Zebe, 882 F. Supp. 1063, 1064-65 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
90. 1 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
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accrued lost wages, benefits, and other remunerations totaled $40,277.57."'1
The court observed that defendant did "not offer any evidence that Plaintiff
would be entitled to any other payments, reimbursements, rewards, recom-
pense, or compensation. 92 Therefore, it is important for a defendant, in its
notice of removal, to provide calculations for potential, and past and front
pay under the applicable claim.
10. Compensatory Damages
In evaluating whether the amount in controversy requirement is satis-
fied, courts may look to a plaintiffs claim for compensatory damages.93 For
example, in Pease v. Medtronic, Inc.,94 the southern district decided that de-
fendant had presented sufficient evidence that compensatory damages "in
cases like this one routinely approach or exceed $75,000."95 However, the
Middle District of Florida has expressed that "[m]aking a general blanket
statement that, if Plaintiff prevails, compensatory damages could certainly
entitle him to thousands of dollars, does not rise to the levels of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75 .000.00.,
9 6
11. Declaratory or Injunctive Relief
Where the plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, the
United States Supreme Court has held that "the amount in controversy is
measured by the value of the object of the litigation. '97 "In other words, the
value of the requested injunctive relief is the monetary value of the benefit
that would flow to the plaintiff if the injunction were granted."" For exam-
ple, where a plaintiff asked the court to void a $9.5 million dollar arbitration
91. Id. at 1366. The court determined this figure by dividing plaintiff's annual salary into
a monthly salary or daily salary, calculating the time between the date of termination and time
of removal, and multiplying the salary by the time. Id.
92. Id. at 1366. See also Viens v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., CIV. No. 3:96cv02602(AHN),
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24029, at *8 n.3 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 1997) (holding that a negligence
action, for purposes of determining amount in controversy, estimated back pay figure from
plaintiffs interrogatory responses are hourly rate X hours/week X number of weeks plaintiff
would have worked between the date of accident and the date of the discovery response).
93. See e.g. Pease v. Medtronic, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
94. Id. at 1354.
95. Id.
96. Golden, I F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
97. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977).
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award and enjoin defendant from placing liens against plaintiffs property,
one district court held that the amount in controversy requirement was met.9
9
However, where a plaintiff asks the court to enjoin a defendant from
engaging in certain practices, such as ongoing harassment or discrimination
in the workplace, but where such injunction would be of no monetary benefit
to the plaintiff, the requested injunctive relief will not satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement.'00 The Eleventh Circuit has recently declared that
for determining the amount in controversy, "the costs borne by [a] defendant
in complying with [an] injunction are irrelevant."'0 ' Moreover, "[t]he remote
possibility-if there be any-that monetary value might somehow flow to
the class plaintiffs from the requested injunctive relief is 'too speculative and
immeasurable to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.""0 2
12. Attorneys' Fees
The United States Supreme Court has established that attorneys' fees
may be included in meeting the amount in controversy requirement where
the governing law allows.0 3 However, in 2003, the Eleventh Circuit clari-
fied that "[t]he general rule is that attorneys' fees do not count towards the
amount in controversy unless they are allowed for by statute or contract. '04
Accordingly, a claim for attorneys' fees arising from a common law cause of
99. Evergreen Forest Prods. of Ga., L.L.C. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1297,
1308 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
100. Cohen, 204 F.3d at 1078-79.
101. Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 n.9 (11 th Cir. 2000). See
Cohen, 204 F.3d at 1079 n.8.
102. Cohen, 204 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v.
Motorola Communications & Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 221-22 (11 th Cir.1997)).
103. Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199 (1933); Cohen, 204 F.3d at 1079
("when a statutory cause of action entitles a party to recover reasonable attorney fees, the
amount in controversy includes consideration of the amount of those fees."); Morrison, 228
F.3d at 1265 ("When a statute authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees, a reasonable amount
of those fees is included in the amount in controversy."); 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3712 (3d ed. 1998) ("The law is now quite settled,...
[that] attorney's fees are a part of the matter in controversy ... when they are provided for by
contract or by state statute."). ld.
104. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 808 n.4 (1lth Cir.
2003). See also Golden v. Dodge-Markham Co., I F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
(holding that although reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs, and expenses were available to
prevailing party under section 448.104 of the Florida Statutes, the court determined that, "by
including attorney's fees with court costs and expenses, it logically follows that they are con-
sidered just that-costs and expenses, which are excluded under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).").
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action may not be included in meeting the amount in controversy require-
ment. '05
Moreover, "when the amount in controversy substantially depends on a
claim for attorney fees, that claim should receive heightened scrutiny," and
defendant may be required to provide documentation to support its claim that
attorneys' fees will exceed the jurisdictional amount. 106 In addition, the court
should also take into account the reasonableness of the purported fee award
in relation to other potential damages in determining whether it satisfies the
jurisdictional minimum. °7 Accordingly, a "disproportionately large amount
of attorney's fees cannot be employed to claim that the amount in contro-
versy requirement was attained."'0 8
13. Punitive Damages
In evaluating whether the amount in controversy requirement is satis-
fied, the Eleventh Circuit has held that courts may look to a plaintiffs de-
mand for punitive damages.'0 9 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court
has held that punitive damages must be included in determining the amount
in controversy requirement if, under the governing law of the suit, they are
recoverable. "0
However, a defendant cannot remove a case merely upon the suspicion
that plaintiff intends to amend its complaint to seek punitive damages."'
Rather, "[i]f and when that happens, the case would then become remov-
able- but not until then."' 2 Likewise, in Federated Mutual Insurance Co.
v. McKinnon Motors," 3 the Eleventh Circuit recently declared that a mere
speculative assertion that punitive damages may exceed $75,000 (e.g. "mere
citation" to what other plaintiffs have received in the past as punitive dam-
ages awards in similar cases) may not satisfy defendant's burden.' "
105. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F.3d at 808 n.4.
106. Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1080 n.10 (11 th Cir. 2000).
107. Cohen, 204 F.3d. at 1080. See also Field v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 8:00-CV-989-T-
24TBM, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5451, at *17 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2001) ("claimed attorney's
fees must obviously be a reasonable and proportional amount.").
108. Field, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5451, at *18.
109. Holley Equip. Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987)
("[P]unitive damages must be considered, [citations omitted] unless it is apparent... that such
cannot be recovered."); see Pease v. Medtronic, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (S.D. Fla.
1998).
110. Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc., 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943).
111. Howard v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 973 F. Supp. 1412, 1418 (N.D. Fla. 1996).
112. Id.
113. 329 F.3d 805 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
114. Id. at 809.
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Moreover, consideration of the amount of punitive damages should take
into account applicable limits on punitive damages awards. For example, in
Barnes v. Ford Motor Co.,"5 the defendant removed a fraud action to federal
court based on diversity and federal question jurisdiction."6 The court re-
manded due to lack of jurisdiction." 7 As to diversity jurisdiction, the court
found that the minimum amount in controversy was not met because, al-
though plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages, the plain-
tiff requested less than $1,000 in compensatory damages." 8 As to punitive
damages, the court reasoned that to meet the minimum amount in contro-
versy, punitive damages would need to exceed $74,000, a figure that was far
in excess of the constitutional limit as set forth in State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell."9 Similarly, one who is removing em-
ployers with less than 101 employees must be aware that Title VII limits
punitive damages in such cases to $50,000.20
14. Liquidated Damages
Liquidated damages and statutory penalties may be included for calcu-
lating whether the amount in controversy has been met.''
15. Costs and Prejudgment and Postjudgment Interest Not Included
The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 precludes consideration of a party's claim
for costs and/or interest in determining whether the amount in controversy
requirement has been satisfied.1
22
115. No. 4:03-cv-0018-DFH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9268, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 30,
2003).
116. Id. at*2.
117. Id.118. Id. at *6-7.
119. Id. at *9.
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3)(A) (2000).
121. See Jackson v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 6:02-1428, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6998, at
*3-6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2003). In FDUPTA case, "amount in controversy include Plaintiffs
requests for the reimbursed purchase price of the OxyContin, treble damages and/or the statu-
tory penalty amount under the FDUTPA, attorney's fees, and the value to the Plaintiff of the
medical monitoring fund." Id. at *6.
122. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F.3d at 808 n.4.
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16. Multiple Claims
"[M]ultiple claims for relief can and should be considered together in
determining the amount in controversy, since there may be multiple recover-
ies if plaintiffs succeed on each claim."'' 23 Furthermore, the Middle District
of Florida recently held that defendants may rely upon the damages claimed
by an unnamed plaintiff in attempting to establish the jurisdictional thresh-
old. 124
E. Supplemental Jurisdiction
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a district court may
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are "so related to
claims in the action within [the court's] such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy....,, In addition, 28 U.S.C. §
1441 (c) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action
within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes
of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court
may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand
all matters in which State law predominates. 126
28 U.S.C.§ 1441(c) serves the same values as supplemental jurisdiction in
that it allows an entire case to be tried in one forum. 127
1. Applies in Federal Question Removal Where There Is No Independent
Basis for Federal Jurisdiction of Pendent State Claims
A district court may properly retain jurisdiction over non-removable
claims joined with separate and independent removable claims.' 28 For exam-
ple, in Newton v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated,29 the court held that
123. Howard, 973 F. Supp. at 1418.
124. See Forest v. Penn Treaty Am. Corp., No. 5:03-45-O-I0GRJ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11869, at *24 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2003).
125. § 1367(a) (2003).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
127. See ERW[N CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.5 (3d ed. 1999).
128. See Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11 th Cir. 1999);
Hayduk v. United Postal Serv., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 584, 600 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
129. 958 F. Supp. 248 (W.D.N.C. 1997).
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plaintiffs claims under the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA")
(which are expressly non-removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d)), were re-
movable under 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(c) where they were joined with removable
sexual harassment claims under Title VII. 130 The court held that the Title VII
claim and the VAWA claim did not arise from the same facts or series of
interlocked transactions and that removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
was proper.' 3' Yet, in Reed v. Heil Co., 32 the Eleventh Circuit refused to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state workers' compensation re-
taliation claim where the court had federal question jurisdiction of an ADA
claim, because the workers' compensation retaliation claim was expressly
non-removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1445.13 3
Although 28 § 1441(c) gives the district court the discretion to remand
"all matters in which State law predominates,"'' 34 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) only
permits remand of claims which are "separate and independent" of the re-
movable claims.3 5 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) does not allow the remand of claims
that are not separate and independent. 136 For example, in Eastus v. Blue Bell
Creameries, L.P.,' 37 an employee, who was terminated after requesting time
off because he expected his wife to give birth, filed a state court action
against his employer for violation of the FMLA, tortious interference, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 38  The employer removed the
case. ' The Fifth Circuit held that the FMLA claim and the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim were not "separate and independent"
causes of action and could not be remanded under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), be-
cause both claims were based on the employee's termination and were sim-
130. Id. at251.
131. Id. See also H & R Block, Ltd. v. Housden, 24 F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D. Tex. 1998). In
H & R Block, the employer filed an action against former employees alleging employees'
breach of their noncompete agreements. Id. at 704. The employees filed a counterclaim al-
leging violations of the FLSA. Id. The counterclaim defendants filed removed the action. Id.
The court held that the removal was proper because the counterclaim was separate and inde-
pendent from the original claim as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), in that the defendants'
counterclaim involved activities that took place during their employment, unlike the plaintiffs
claim which was rooted in activities that took place following the termination of their em-
ployment. Id. at 706.
132. 206 F.3d 1055 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
133. Id. at 1057.
134. 28 u.S.C. § 1441(c) (2003).
135. Id.
136. See Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 106 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1441(c)).
137. 97 F.3d 100 (5th Cir. 1996).
138. Id. at 102-103.
139. Id. at 103.
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ply different theories of recovery. 4 ° However, the court affirmed the remand
of the tortious interference claim because the FMLA and tortious interfer-
ence claims were separate and independent under 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(c). 14'
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the state claim must be a judicially cognizable
cause of action and the state and federal claims must "derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact."' 142 District courts may decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion over pendent claims for a number of valid reasons. 143  28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) provides that:
district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim... if-
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction. 144
In addition to its discretion under § 1367(c), district courts "may decline
to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise 'exceptional circumstances,' where
denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing
interest, for example, where abstention is warranted by considerations of
'proper constitutional adjudication,' 'regard for federal-state relations,' or
'wise judicial administration.'"141
A "district court may, at its discretion, exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over state law claims even where it has dismissed all claims over which
it had original jurisdiction, [even though] it cannot exercise supplemental
jurisdiction unless there is first a proper basis for original federal jurisdic-
140. Id. at 105.
141. Id. at 105-6; see also In re City of Mobile, 75 F.3d 605, 608 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (citing
Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951)) (where "a single accident occurred, and
state and federal claims were filed based on that accident ... section 1441(c) is not applicable
because no separate and independent claim exists").
142. City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997) (quoting Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
143. See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (citing Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966)).
144. § 1367(c).
145. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (quoting Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959))) (internal citations omitted).
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tion. ' ' 14 6 However, "when all federal claims are eliminated in the early stages
of litigation, the balance of factors generally favors declining to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and dismissing them
without prejudice."' 47
2. Not Necessary in Diversity Cases
Under the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,148 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
no longer applies to diversity cases. Rather, the ability to remove under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 requires that amount in controversy requirements are met and




A case "may be removed [only] by the defendant or the defendants."' 50
Plaintiffs may not remove a case, even to defend against a counterclaim.' 5'




1. Thirty Days from Service of Complaint Demonstrating a Basis
for Removal
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through ser-
vice or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the
claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or
146. Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir.
1996)(citing Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992)).
147. Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir. 1998).
148. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5113 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1367 (2000)).
149. Blasberg v. Oxbow Power Corp., 934 F. Supp. 21, 23 (D. Mass. 1996).
150. 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) (2000).
151. See 14C CHARLES A. WRIGHT et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: § 3731 (3d
ed. 1998).
152. Manorcare Potomac v. Understein, 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D594, 595 n.1 (Fla. Oct.
16, 2002) (noting that there is an exception for third-party defendants proceeding under 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2000)).
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within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant
if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not re-
quired to be served on the defendant, whichever period is
shorter. 
53
"The thirty day period is not jurisdictional, but is rather a strictly ap-
plied rule of procedure that may not be extended by the court."'' 54 "Thus,
section 1446(b)'s mandatory removal period cannot be enlarged by court
order, stipulation of the parties, or otherwise."' 5 5 However, the court of the
Middle District of Florida has stated that "it may be waived by the parties by
'affirmative conduct or unequivocal assent of a sort which would render it
offensive to fundamental principles of fairness to remand."",156 It is important
to note that a defendant's reliance upon an agreement with a plaintiff to
enlarge the time for removal for waiver purposes is considered per se unrea-
sonable-agreements to extend the statutory removal period are void
ab initio."'
2. When Does the Clock Begin to Run?
Despite the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), a defendant's time to re-
move is not triggered until actual service of process (e.g. not by mere receipt
of a complaint (e.g. by facsimile) unattended by any formal service). 5 8 In its
1999 decision in Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipestringing, Inc.,159 the
Supreme Court explained:
First, if the summons and complaint are served together, the 30-
day period for removal runs at once. Second, if the defendant is
served with the summons but the complaint is furmished to the de-
fendant sometime after, the period for removal runs from the de-
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
154. BCC Apts., Ltd. v. Browning, 994 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (citing Lie-
big v. DeJoy, 814 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
155. Harris Corp. v. Kollsman, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1151 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
156. Liebig, 814 F. Supp. at 1076 (quoting Maybruck v. Haim, 290 F. Supp. 721, 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
157. Harris Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2dat 1152.
158. Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999). But see lmco
USA, Inc. v. Title Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 1322, 1323 (M.D. Fla. 1990) ("Service of process
under state law does not control for removal purposes. What is important is that the Defen-
dant was on notice of the pending action through receipt of the 'initial pleading."') (citing
Perimeter Lighting, Inc. v. Karlton, 456 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ga. 1978)) (internal citations
omitted).
159. Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 353-55.
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fendant's receipt of the complaint. Third if the defendant is served
with the summons and the complaint is filed in court, but under lo-
cal rules, service of the complaint is not required, the removal pe-
riod runs from the date the complaint is made available through fil-
ing. Finally, if the complaint is filed in court prior to any service,
the removal period runs from the service of the summons.'
60
Nonetheless, although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the issue,
it is relatively clear that a defendant is permitted to remove a case prior to
proper service of process, as long as the complaint has been filed.16' Accord-
ingly, a defendant's removal of a case from state court to federal district
court is not premature if such removal is made before formal service of proc-
ess takes place."62
3. Multiple Defendants Served at Different Times
A still unresolved issue is when a notice of removal must be filed when
there are multiple defendants served at different times. 6 3 Some courts, in-
cluding the Middle District of Florida, have held that service upon the first of
multiple defendants starts the § 1446(b) clock."6 Therefore, the first-served
defendant must petition for removal within thirty days, in accordance with
Murphy Bros., regardless of when the other defendants have been served.
65
Other courts have rejected the first-served rule and have held that a later-
served defendant has thirty days from his receipt of service to remove, with
the consent of the other defendants (including those previously-served de-
fendants who failed to remove).'66
4. No Later Than One Year Since Commencement of State Court
Proceedings
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides that "a case may not be removed on the
basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 [diversity] of this title more
160. Id. at 354.
161. See Bell v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 582, 583-84 (S.D. Miss. 2003).
162. See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 176-77 (5th Cir. 2000).
163. See Smith v. Health Ctr. of Lake City, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1345-46 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
164. See id.; Faulk v. Superior Indus. Int'l, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 457,458 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
165. Health Ctr. of Lake City, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1344-45 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
166. See Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 1999);
see also Diebel v. S.B. Trucking Co., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1327-28 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (de-
clining to decide whether "later-served" or "first-served" rule applies).
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than 1 year after commencement of the action." '167 Some courts, most re-
cently the Fifth Circuit, have held that the one-year time limit is not jurisdic-
tional and is subject to equitable tolling.'68 Accordingly, if a plaintiff has
requested less than 75,000 dollars in his or her complaint, and over one year
later, files a motion in state court for leave to add a claim for punitive dam-
ages pursuant to section 768.72 of the Florida Statutes, plaintiffs motion
could serve as a basis for defendant removing beyond the one-year limit.,
69
However, the Eleventh Circuit has expressed in dicta that the one-year bar on
removal should not be equitably tolled. 7'
5. Prerequisites to Removal
Although, generally, a defendant can only remove a case to federal
court within thirty days after receiving the pleading, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
provides:
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice
of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the de-
fendant, through service... of a copy of an amended pleading,
motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascer-
tained that the case is one which is or has become removable.'
7
'
The words "other paper" in the above-quoted provision have been
broadly interpreted by courts and have allowed for a wide array of docu-
ments to serve as a trigger, commencing a new thirty-day period for previ-
ously unremovable cases that have now become removable. 72 "Other paper"
includes damages interrogatories, demonstrating existence of the jurisdic-
tional amount. 73 For example, in Fleming v. Colonial Stores, Inc.,'74 "[t]he
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
168. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2003); Wilson v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 781 n.1 (1 th Cir. 1981).
169. Pease v. Medtronic, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
170. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 n. 12 (11 th Cir. 1994):
[C]ongress knew when it passed the one year bar on removal that some plaintiffs would attempt to
defeat diversity by fraudulently (and temporarily) joining a non-diverse party. In that case, as long
as there is some possibility that a non-diverse joined party could be liable in the action, there is no
federal jurisdiction. . . .[A] plaintiff could defeat jurisdiction by joining a non-diverse party and
dismissing him after the deadline. Congress has recognized and accepted that, in some circum-
stances, plaintiff can and will intentionally avoid federal jurisdiction..
Id.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (emphasis added).
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original complaint ... filed in state court merely stated jurisdictional amount
for the state court and was not specific in meeting the test of federal jurisdic-
tion ... , Defendants served damages interrogatories, to which the plain-
tiff asserted a claim in excess of the jurisdictional amount.'76 The northern
district held that "[a]s long as the [plaintiffs] claim is indeterminate from the
complaint, or otherwise, the defendant may not be charged with the running
of time for removal.' 77
Likewise, in Field v. National Life Insurance Co.,' the defendant did
not remove until eight months after the complaint was filed. 79 Defendant
argued that it was not until it received plaintiffs answers to its damages in-
terrogatories that defendant "could 'first ascertain' that the amount in con-
troversy requirement had been met."' 8° The middle district stated that "[i]t is
clear that interrogatory answers can constitute 'other papers' for removal
purposes.' 8' To determine whether the amount in controversy was apparent
at the time plaintiff filed the complaint, the court analyzed the total amount
of actual damages that would have accrued at that point.
82
Other examples of "other paper" that could prompt a defendant's right
to remove include transcripts of depositions, offers of judgment,'8 3 settlement
demand letters,8 4 responses to requests for admissions, 85 letters between
174. 279 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
175. Id. at 934.
176. Id.
177. Id.; see also Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1362 (S.D.
Fla. 2000) (stating a nonparty's mere motion to intervene cannot furnish a basis for removal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), despite defendant's claims that motion raised federal ques-
tion).
178. No. 8:00-CV-989-T-24TBM, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5451, *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22,
2001).
179. Id. at *5 n.1.
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id. at *20.
182. Id. at *12; see Basso v. United Wis. Life Ins. Co., No. 97-573-CIV-GRAHAM, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9996, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 1997).
183. See Essenson v. Coale, 848 F. Supp. 987, 990 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
184. See Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (granting
motion for remand because defendant did not remove within thirty days from receipt (subse-
quent to formal service of process) via facsimile of plaintiffs written settlement demand from
which defendant could determine the case was removable because the amount in controversy
requirement was satisfied).
185. See Hines v. AC & S, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1006 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting that
"other paper" can include answers to interrogatories, responses to requests for admissions,
deposition testimony, and documents produced in discovery).
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attorneys, 86 and motions for summary judgment. ' However, an "affidavit,
created entirely by the defendant, is not 'other paper' under section 1446(b)
and cannot start the accrual of the 30-day period for removing. ' 88
"[A] defendant who receives a pleading or other paper indicating the
post commencement ... dismissal of a nondiverse party-may remove the
case to federal court within 30 days of receiving such information.', 89 The
general rule regarding dismissal of a nondiverse party is "if the resident de-
fendant was dismissed from the case by the voluntary act of the plaintiff, the
case became removable, but if the dismissal was the result of either the de-
fendant's or the court's action against the wish of the plaintiff, the case could
not be removed."' 90
6. Revival Exception
The Middle District of Florida has:
acknowledged the existence of a judicially created "revival excep-
tion" under which removal rights may be revived in two types of
cases: where a plaintiff deliberately misleads a defendant about
the true nature of the case until the thirty day removal limit expires
or when an amended complaint is filed which "fundamentally al-
186. See Polk v. Sentry Ins., 129 F. Supp. 2d 975, 978-79 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (stating that
the letter between attorneys confirming that plaintiff's dismissal of nondiverse defendants was
voluntary is "other paper" sufficient to trigger time to remove).
187. See Miller v. BAS Technical Employment Placement Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780
(S.D. W. Va. 2001) (holding that first defendant's motion for summary judgment was "other
paper," the filing of which provided notice to second defendant that the action was removable
under diversity jurisdiction on basis that nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined).
188. S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1996).
189. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 69 (1996); 28 U.S.C. §1446(b). See also
Hessler v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 684 F. Supp. 393, 395 (D. Del. 1988) (finding that
the thirty-day period begins to run when the defendants received "actual notice that the case
has become removable, which may be communicated in a formal or informal manner."); See
also Broderick v. Dellasandro, 859 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding that attorney's
letter advising of client's changed residence that created diversity jurisdiction was "other
paper" such that it triggered the thirty-day time period for removal under removal statute).
190. Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 252 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Weems v. Louis Drey-
fus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967)) (quoting Note, The Effect of Section 1446(b) on
the Nonresident's Right to Remove, 115 U. PA. L. Rev. 264, 267 (1966)).
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ter[s]" the complexion of the case to such a degree that the
amended complaint creates "an essentially new lawsuit."' 91
"[T]he revival exception is available only in those very narrow circum-
stances where the facts of the case are compelling enough to risk contraven-
tion of the two-fold purpose of the thirty day removal limitation."'' 92
7. Removal Pursuant to Other Statutes
Other statutes provide specific prerequisites for removal of a case under
their provisions. For example, the Federally Supported Health Centers As-
sistance Act of 1995 ("FSHCAA") provides specific prerequisites for re-
moval. 193  Likewise, "removal of an action under [28 U.S.C.] section
1442(a)(1) [Federal Officer Removal Statute] has historically required the
satisfaction of two separate requirements. First the defendant must advance
a 'colorable defense arising out of [his or her] duty to enforce federal
law;""' 194 and "[s]econd, the defendant must establish that there is a 'causal
connection between what the officer has done under asserted official author-
ity' and the action against him" or her.' 95
8. Removal Permitted Even if State Court Lacked Jurisdiction
Until 1986, it was generally accepted that "[i]f the state court lacks ju-
risdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires
191. Clegg v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 285 B.R. 23, 31 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (quoting Wil-
son v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference Athletic Ass'n, 668 F.2d 962, 965-66 (7th Cir.
1982)).
192. Clegg, 285 B.R. at 31. (citing Wilson, 668 F.2d at 966.).
193. See Allen v. Christenberry, 327 F.3d 1290, 1291 (11 th Cir. 2003). Under 42 U.S.C. §
233(l)(1), the Attorney General may remove case if he makes an appearance in state court
within fifteen days and:
Upon a certification by the Attorney General that the defendant was acting in the scope of his em-
ployment at the time of the incident out of which the suit arose, any such civil action or proceeding
commenced in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney
General to the district court of the United States of the district and division embracing the place
wherein it is pending ....
42 U.S.C. § 233(c) (2000). If the Attorney General does not make an appearance within fif-
teen days, § 233(l)(2) provides that the entity, employee, or contractor can remove the case to
district court. 42 U.S.C. 233(l)-(2). Under the general removal statute, the individual has
thirty days from notification in which to remove this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
194. Magnin v.Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1427 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (citing Mesa
v. California, 487 U.S. 121, 133 (1989) (in turn quoting Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402,
407 (1969)).
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none, although it might in a like suit originally brought there have had juris-
diction."' 96 This theory (known as "derivative jurisdiction") was abrogated
by the 1986 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e), which "provides that a dis-
trict court to which a civil action is removed is 'not precluded from hearing
and determining any claim' simply because the state court from which the
action was removed 'did not have jurisdiction over that claim."" 9 7
B. Waiver - Actions in State Court Prior to Removal
A defendant waives its right to remove by taking "clear and unequivo-
cal" actions in state court that manifest its intent to have the matter adjudi-
cated there, after it is apparent that the case is removable. 98 Although it is
not always clear what actions are considered "clear and unequivocal" mani-
festations of a defendant's intent to have the matter adjudicated in state court,
the Southern District of Florida recently explained that, "[i]n general, the
right of removal is waived when the defendant seeks affirmative relief, re-
covery or an adjudication on the merits in the state court."' 99 For example, in
Paris v. Affleck, 00 the Middle District held that the defendant waived the
right to remove to federal court by first filing a counterclaim in state court.20'
Likewise, in Scholz v. RDV Sports, Inc., °2 the Middle District remanded a
case on grounds that defendant had filed a motion to dismiss in state court
and scheduled a hearing on that motion.0 3 However, the Middle District has
subsequently held that the filing of a motion to dismiss "in and of itself does
not necessarily constitute a waiver of defendant's right to proceed in the fed-
eral forum.' 2 4 Similarly, the Southern District of Florida, in Somoano v.
196. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
197. See Hollis v. Fla. State Univ., 259 F.3d 1295, 1298 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Bland v.
Freightliner LLC, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1212 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)
(2000)).
198. Scholz v. RDV Sports, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1469, 1470 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citing Miami
Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ferre, 606 F. Supp. 122, 124 (S.D. Fla. 1984)) (holding that a defendant
waives the right to remove if the defendant's intent to proceed in state court is clear and un-
equivocal).
199. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
200. 431 F. Supp. 878 (M.D.. Fla. 1977).
201. Id. at 880; see also Briggs v. Miami Window Corp., 158 F. Supp. 229, 230 (M.D. Ga.
1956) (defendant waived removal by filing non-compulsory cross-action in state court).
202. 821 F. Supp. 1469 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
203. Id. at 1471; see also Kam Hon, Inc. v. Cigna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 933 F. Supp.
1060, 1063 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that defendant waived right to remove when it first filed
a motion to dismiss in state court).
204. Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1354 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
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Ryder Systems, Inc.,2 °5 held that a defendant whose sole action in the state
court is filing a motion to dismiss prior to petitioning for removal did not
indicate an intent to waive his rights to remove because "[t]he Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure cannot operate to shorten the time period within which to
remove a state court Complaint to federal court, and a defendant should not
be required to file a motion for extension of time in state court merely to
observe both courts' procedural requirements. 2 6
An action to maintain the status quo in state court, as opposed to an ac-
tion to dispose of the matter, does not constitute a waiver.20 7 Examples of
actions to maintain the status quo include defending preliminary injunctions,
filing answers and affirmative defenses.20 8 The Fifth Circuit has held that
"the right to removal is not lost by participating in state court proceedings
short of seeking an adjudication on the merits."209
C. Filing Requirements
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) provides:
A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or
criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district
court of the United States for the district and division within which
such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short
and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a
copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such de-
fendant or defendants in such action.210
1. Short and Plain Statement of the Grounds for Removal
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) requires a short and plain statement of the basis for
removal. 211 The notice of removal should contain "all grounds which support
the federal court's jurisdiction. 2 2 The Eleventh Circuit recently expressed
205. 985 F. Supp. 1476 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
206. Id. at 1478.
207. See Paris, 431 F. Supp. at 880.
208. See id.
209. Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Beighley
v. F.D.I.C., 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989), quoting LA JAMES A. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.157[4] at 153 (3d ed. 1987)).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
211. Id.
212. Lewis v. AT & T Corp., 898 F. Supp. 907, 908 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
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that "it is undoubtedly best to include all relevant evidence in the petition for
removal and motion to remand.
213
2. All Process, Pleadings, and Orders Served upon Such Defendant
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) requires that the removing defendant must file,
with the notice of removal, "a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders
served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. '2 14 Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(b), local rules of procedure have expanded upon this require-
ment.21 5 For example, Middle District of Florida Local Rule 4.02(b) requires
a removing defendant to file with the Notice of Removal not only those
documents required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), but also "all process, pleadings,
orders, and other papers or exhibits of every kind, including depositions, then
on file in the state court., 2 16 The Northern District also requires a removing
defendant to file "all process, pleadings, motions, and orders then on file in
the state court," but allows the defendant 10 days to do so.
217
3. Filing Fee and Civil Cover Sheet
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914, a party "instituting any civil action, suit
or proceeding ... by ... removal" must pay a filing fee.2 " Additionally, a
removing party must submit a civil cover sheet.21 9
4. Signed Pursuant to Rule 11
At least one attorney of record must sign the Notice of Removal pursu-
ant to the duties set forth in Rule 11, and must provide his or her address and
telephone number.220 Rule 11 requires defendant to "investigate the appro-
priateness of removal. '2 1 "Further, '[e]very lawyer is an officer of the court.
213. Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000) however,
"there is no good reason to keep a district court from eliciting or reviewing evidence outside
the removal petition." Id.
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides that a district court "may require the removing party to
file with its clerk copies of all records and proceedings in such State court."
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a); M.D. FLA. R. 4.02(b).
217. N.D. FLA. Loc. R. 7.2(A).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)(2000).
219. M.D. FLA. LOC. R. 1.05(e).
220. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (a).
221. Collings v. E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 892, 895 (N.D. Fla.
1996) (citing McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992)).
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And, in addition to his duty of diligently researching his client's case, he al-
ways has a duty of candor to the tribunal.'
222
5. Multiple Defendants - Unanimity Rule
In cases involving multiple defendants, all named defendants must join
the removal petition for removal to be proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1446.223 "This is commonly referred to as the 'rule of unanimity.' ' 224 There
is disagreement among the district courts as to what exactly is required to
effectuate consent, although most courts have held that the removing defen-
dant must do more than simply state in the removal notice that all defendants
consent to removal.225 At the very least, the Notice of Removal should state
that all defendants consent to the removal and should be signed by counsel
on behalf of all defendants.226
In Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co.,2 7 the Southern District recently
held that all defendants consented to removal where 1) "the first sentence of
the Notice stated that it was jointly filed by all Defendants," 2) "the Notice
222. Letner v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1296 n.2 (N.D. Fla.
2001) (quoting Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11 th Cir. 1994)).
223. See Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 342 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2003); Hernandez
v. Seminole County, 334 F.3d 1233, 1237 (11 th Cir. 2003) ("The failure to join all defendants
in the petition is a defect in the removal procedure.") (citing In re Bethesda Mem'l Hosp.,
Inc., 123 F.3d 1407, 1410 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1997)); In re Ocean Marine Mut. Prot. and Indem.
Ass'n. Ltd. 3 F.3d 353, 355 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
224. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2000)
(citing Codapro Corp. v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 322, 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
225. See Jones v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355
(S.D. Fla. 2002) (citing Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 n.l I (5th
Cir. 1988)) (holding that statement in Notice that all defendants have consented to removal
was insufficient without "some timely filed written indication from each served defendant, or
from some person or entity purporting to formally act on its behalf in this respect and to have
authority to do so, that it has actually consented to such action"); Nathe v. Pottenberg, 931 F.
Supp. 822, 825 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (stating "to effect removal, each defendant must join in the
removal by signing the notice of removal or by explicitly stating for itself its consent on the
record, either orally or in writing, within the 30-day period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b)"); Jasper v. Wal-Mart Stores, 732 F. Supp. 104, 105 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Fell-
hauer v. City of Geneva, 673 F. Supp. 1445 (N.D. I11. 1987)) (noting "all defendants, served at
the time of filing the petition, must join in the removal petition; the petition must be signed by
all defendants or the signer must allege consent of all defendants"); Crawford v. Fargo Mfg.
Co., 341 F. Supp. 762, 763 (D.C. Fla. 1972) (noting "[t]here is authority to the effect that all
defendants need not sign the original removal petition ... [h]owever, it is clear that all defen-
dants who have been served must join in the petition for removal") (internal citations omitted).
226. See Smith v. Health Ctr. of Lake City, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1340 (M.D. Fla.
2003) (citing Getty, 841 F.2d at 1262 n. 11).
227. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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explained that each defendant had decided to join in the single Notice of
Removal in order to avoid a multiplicity of notices of removal, 228 3) the
notice was signed counsel for the corporate defendant "on behalf of all de-
fendants for purposes of removal only,"'229 and 4) "all the defendants ex-
pressed their consent to removal by appearing before [the court at a] Status
Conference," at which the counsel for the corporate defendant acknowledged
that he spoke on behalf of the other defendants and indicated that defendants
had agreed to file a single response to both motions to remand.230
6. Exceptions to the Unanimity Rule
There are three exceptions to the unanimity rule; namely: "1) the non-
consenting defendants had not been served with process at the time the no-
tice of removal was filed; 2) the unconsenting defendants are nominal or
formal defendants; or 3) removal is pursuant to § 144 1(c)." 2 31 In addition,
the requirement of unanimity for consent of all defendants does not apply
where removal is pursuant to a statute other than the general removal provi-
sions.232 Where an exception would apply, "[a]lthough the preferred practice
is for a removing defendant to explain in its Notice of Removal why other
defendants have not joined in the Notice, there is no clear authority that this
failure constitutes a fatal defect in a Notice of Removal."233
a. Later-Served Defendants
With regard to the first exception, "a defendant that has not been served
with process need not join in or consent to removal., 234 Defendants who had
228. Id. at 1360.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1360; see also Diebel v. S.B. Trucking Co., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1327-28
(M.D. Fla. 2003) (holding where the Notice of Removal was signed by counsel for two of the
three named defendants only on behalf of those two defendants, removal was improper despite
the fact that the defense counsel for the two defendants expected to represent the third in the
near future).
231. Bradwell v. Silk Greenhouse, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 940, 943 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citing
Alexander v. Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 n. I I (M.D. Ala. 1991)).
232. See In re Fed. Savs. & Loan Ins. Corp., 837 F.2d 432, 435 (1 th Cir. 1988) (Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation removal provisions); Sheinberg v. Princess Cruise
Lines, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (Convention on Recognition of For-
eign Arbitral Awards removal provision).
233. Liebig v. DeJoy, 814 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
234. GMFS, L.L.C. v. Bounds, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1354, (S.D. Ala. 2003).
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not been served at the time of removal must join an otherwise timely removal
within thirty days after service of the complaint.
35
b. Nominal Defendants
With regard to the:
exception to the unanimity rule which provides that 'nominal or
formal parties, being neither necessary nor indispensable, are not
required to join in the petition for removal' . . . '[t]he ultimate test
of whether the ... defendants are ... indispensable parties ... is
whether in the absence of the [defendant], the Court can enter a fi-
nal judgment consistent with equity and good conscience which
would not be in any way unfair or inequitable to plaintiff.'
236
c. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
With regard to the exception relating to actions removed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441(c), an action may be removed if:
a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the ju-
risdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one
or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the
entire case may be removed and the district court may determine
all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in
which State law predominates.237
D. Notice of Removal
The notice of removal must in writing and be given to all adverse par-
ties in the action, and a copy of the notice of removal must be filed promptly
235. Jasper v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 104, 105 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Fell-
hauer v. City of Geneva, 673 F. Supp. 1445 (N.D. I11. 1987)); McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of
Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992).
236. Health Ctr. of Lake City, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1338 n.5 (citations omitted) (citing
to Tri-Cities Newspapers, Inc. v. Tri-Cities Printing Pressmen & Assistants Union of N.A.,
427 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1970))..
237. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000); see Belasco v. W.K.P. Wilson & Sons, Inc., 833 F.2d
277 (1Ith Cir. 1987) (stating removal under § 1441(c) was unavailable because all claims
against the insurer and insurance broker arose from one single injury to plaintiffs).
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with the state court.238 "[F]ailure of notice to the state court is a procedural
defect that does not defeat federal jurisdiction . ,,239
E. Section 1.01 Amendments to the Notice of Removal
Amendments within the original thirty-day period for removal are gen-
erally freely made; however, after the thirty-day period has expired, amend-
ments are generally permitted only to allow the correction of errors or to
provide more detail regarding grounds for removal which have been previ-
ously stated.240 Although an amendment may be allowed, most courts have
held that it is not necessary.
24 1
F. To Which Court Should the Case Be Removed?
A case should be removed "to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where such action is pend-
ing. '242 However, the Eleventh Circuit recently determined that failure to
comply with these geographic requirements does not amount to a jurisdic-
tional defect.
2 43
Middle District Local Rule 4.02(a) requires that all removed cases be
docketed "in the Division encompassing the county of the State in which the
case was pending. '24
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2000).
239. Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1395 (11th Cir. 1997).
240. See Bradwell v. Silk Greenhouse, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 940, 943 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
Deficiencies in the notice of removal can be corrected within the thirty day time period; however,
once the thirty day period has elapsed 'the notice of removal may be amended only to set out more
specially grounds of removal that already have been stated, albeit, imperfectly in the original peti-
tion.
Id. (quotes and citations omitted); Denton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 340, 341
(M.D. Fla. 1990) ("Assuming that a petition for removal is properly filed, it may be amended
freely only within the statutory period of thirty days from service of the complaint. Thereafter,
it may be amended only to set forth more specifically grounds for removal which were stated
imperfectly in the original petition.").
241. See, e.g., Yamevic v. Brink's, Inc., 102 F.3d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Wil-
lingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 n.3 (1969) (stating that when reviewing a removal
petition for diversity jurisdiction "it is proper to treat the removal petition as if it had been
amended to include the relevant information contained in the later-filed affidavits.").
242. 28 US.C. § 144 1(a) (2000).
243. See Peterson, 124 F.3d at 1395.
244. M.D. FLA. Loc. R. 4.02(a).
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III. POST-REMOVAL PROCEDURES
Post-removal procedures are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447 and Rule
81 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with which a defendant should
strictly comply in order to avoid remand.245 Upon removal, repleading is not
necessary unless the court so orders.246
Removal is effective as of the date the removal petition is filed, there-
fore after a defendant files its notice of removal and serves notice to both the
adverse parties and to the clerk of the court, "the state court shall proceed no
further unless and until the case is remanded. '2 47 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit has concluded that "the filing of a removal petition terminates the
state court's jurisdiction until the case is remanded, even in a case improp-
erly removed., 248 However, Florida state courts have been less willing to
accept this proposition, and in at least one case held "that proceedings subse-
quent to removal 'are valid if the suit was not in fact removable.' 249 None-
theless, a district court may enjoin proceedings in a state court where the
case has been removed to federal court under the Anti-Injunction Act, be-
cause an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283 allows for injunctions that a federal
court finds "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." ,2 0
A. Answer
Pursuant to Rule 81(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in a re-
moved action in which the defendant has not answered,
the defendant shall answer or present the other defenses or objec-
tions ... within 20 days after the receipt through service or other-
wise of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for re-
lief upon which the action or proceeding is based, or within 20
days after the service of summons upon such initial pleading, then
filed, or within 5 days after the filing of the petition for removal,
whichever period is longest.
251
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2000); FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
246. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 1(c).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2000).
248. Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., 861 F.2d 1248, 1254 n. II ( lIth Cir. 1988) (citing Lowe
v. Jacobs, 243 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1957)).
249. See Hunnewell v. Palm Beach County, 786 So. 2d 4, 4-5 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
250. Maseda, 861 F.2d at 1254; see 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
251. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
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"[B]ecause it is the latest of these periods which defines the time within
which a responsive pleading must be filed, a responsive pleading will be
required under Rule 81(c) only when: the defendant is in receipt of the com-




Rule 81 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
If at the time of removal all necessary pleadings have been served,
a party entitled to trial by jury under Rule 38 shall be accorded it,
if the party's demand therefor is served within 10 days after the pe-
tition for removal is filed if the party is the petitioner, or if not the
petitioner within 10 days after service on the party of the notice of
filing the petition. A party who, prior to removal, has made an ex-
press demand for trial by jury in accordance with state law, need
not make a demand after removal. If state law applicable in the
court from which the case is removed does not require the parties
to make express demands in order to claim trial by jury, they need
not make demands after removal unless the court directs that they
do so within a specified time if they desire to claim trial by jury.
The court may make this direction on its own motion and shall do
so as a matter of course at the request of any party. The failure of
a party to make demand as directed constitutes a waiver by that
party of trial by jury. 3
C. Legal Memoranda
Middle District Local Rule 4.02(c) provides: "When a case is removed
to this court with pending motions on which briefs or legal memoranda have
not been submitted, the moving party shall file and serve a supporting brief
within ten (10) days after the removal in accordance with Rule 3.01(a) [gov-
erning form of motions] ....
252. Silva v. City of Madison, 69 F.3d 1368, 1371 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) The
court stated consistent with fundamental principles of federal procedure, "a responsive plead-
ing is required only after service has been effected." Id. at 1376.
253. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
254. M.D. FLA. Loc. R. 4.02(c). See also N.D. FLA. Loc. R. 7.2(B); S.D. FLA. Loc. R. 7.2.
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D. Rule 59 Motions-Motions to Vacate State Court Judgment Must Be Filed
Within 10 Days of Date of Removal
"[W]hen a case... has in it at the time of removal an order or judgment
of the state trial judge which, had it been entered by a district judge, would
be appealable ... the party seeking an appeal [must first] move that the dis-
trict judge modify or vacate the order or judgment." '55 A motion to modify
or vacate the order or judgment must be filed within ten days of removal in
order to preserve the right to appeal. 6
E. Plaintiff's Responses to Defeat Removal
1. Amended Complaint
In an effort to defeat removal, plaintiffs occasionally attempt to amend
the complaint to seek damages in an amount no greater than $49,999.257 This
tactic was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in Harmon v. OKI Systems. 258 The
Harmon court also noted another case where the plaintiff's effort to file a
post-removal stipulation stating that he would not seek to recover more than
the jurisdictional amount, was no more than an effort "to pull the rug out
from under the district court., 259 The court further recognized that evidence
that was not on the record on the date of removal should not be considered
because it does not "shed[] light on the situation which existed when the case
was removed., 26 °
Additionally, in a federal question case, a plaintiff may attempt to dis-
miss its federal claims after removal in an effort to effectuate remand.26' In
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,262 the Supreme Court upheld a district
court's remand in such a case.263 In Cohill, the plaintiff sued in state court
for age discrimination under applicable federal and state laws.26 After re-
255. Jackson v. Am. Sav. Mortgage Corp., 924 F.2d 195, 199 (11 th Cir. 1991).
256. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bakker, 51 F.3d 242, 245-46 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
257. See Harmon v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 1997).
258. 115 F.3d 477, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1997).
259. Id. at 479; see generally, In re Shell Oil Co. 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992).
260. Id. at 480. See also George v. Marriott Senior Living Services, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22822 at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2001) ("Plaintiff, after more than a year of litigation
and obvious attempts by defendant to obtain a firmer number [regarding amount of damages
sought], cannot now seek to amend the complaint to affirmatively demand an amount of dam-
ages below the jurisdictional threshold.").
261. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
262. 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
263. Id. at 357.
264. Id. at 345.
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moval, the plaintiff dismissed the federal claim and requested remand.265
The Court held that remand was appropriately within the district court's dis-
cretion."'
2. Joinder
Plaintiffs also occasionally respond to a notice of removal by attempting
to amend the complaint by joining a Florida resident as an additional party
defendant.267 This tactic would destroy complete diversity and would compel
the remand of this action. 68 However, joinder must be proper in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.269 Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1447
(e) provides that "[i]f after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional de-
fendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court




1. Motion to Dismiss Venue
The Eleventh Circuit in Hollis v. Florida State University recently held
that state-law venue deficiencies can not be the basis for dismissal of a re-
moved action.271 The court held that "[u]pon removal the question of venue
is governed by federal law, not state law, and under § 1441(a), a properly
removed action necessarily fixes venue in the district where the state court
action was pending. 272  The court explained that "once a case is properly
removed to federal court, a defendant cannot move to dismiss on § 1391
venue grounds. 273 However, "[a] defendant dissatisfied with venue after
removal may ... seek a transfer to another division or district under federal
law. 274
265. Id. at 347.
266. Id. at 357.




270. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (2000).
271. 259 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11 th Cir. 2001).
272. Id. at 1296.
273. Id. at 1299.
274. Id. at 1296.
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2. Process After Removal
28 U.S.C. § 1448 provides that in removed cases "in which any one or
more of the defendants has not been [properly] served with process... such
process or service may be completed or new process issued in the same man-
ner as in cases originally filed in such district court. '275
G. Remand
The proper method for challenging removal is a motion for remand.
1. Grounds for Remand
Grounds for remand include: 1) defective removal procedure; 2) lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; and 3) discretionary remand under 28 U.S.C. §
1367.276
2. Procedure for Remand
a. Time for Motions: Thirty Days for Defective Procedure, Otherwise
Waived
28 U.S.C.§ 1447(c) provides that "[a] motion to remand the case on the
basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be
made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section
1446(a). 277 Objections to defects in removal are waived by a plaintiff's fail-
ure to timely file a motion for remand within thirty days. 8
In general, a procedural defect is any technical substantive or proce-
dural error which is not a challenge to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.279
"The failure to join all defendants in the petition is a defect in the removal
procedure. 2 s°
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (2000).
276. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 348 (1988) (holding that "a
district court has discretion to remand a removed case to state court when all federal-law
claims have dropped out of the action and only pendent state-law claims remain.").
277. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000)(emphasis added).
278. Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 781 n.1 (1 th Cir. 1989).
279. See Pierpoint v. Barnes, 94 F.3d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1996).
280. Hernandez v. Seminole County, 334 F.3d 1233, 1237 (11 th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re
Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc. 123 F.3d 1407, 1410 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1997)). See generally Russell
Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1044 (11 th Cir. 2001).
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b. Lack of Jurisdiction at Any Time
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that "[i]f at any time before final judg-
ment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
case shall be remanded., 281' The Supreme Court has interpreted this provi-
sion as meaning that remand may take place 'at any time' because of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction may take place "at any time. 2 82 Remands based
upon forum selection clauses are remands based upon jurisdiction rather than
defects in removal procedure. 83
c. Sua Sponte Remand for Defective Removal Procedure Not Permitted
Although a court may remand because of lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion sua sponte,84 the Eleventh Circuit recently held in Whole Health Chiro-
practic & Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Medical Plan, Inc.2 85 that 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) does not authorize any sua sponte remand order not based on subject
matter jurisdiction-even if made within the thirty-day period.2 86 Rather, the
court must wait for the plaintiff to file a motion for remand. 87
d. Sua Sponte Consideration of Discretionary Remand of Non-Federal
Claims in Federal Jurisdiction Cases
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) provides that where removal was based upon a
"separate and independent" federal question claim, the court may remand the
otherwise non-removable portions. 8 In addition, a district court exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim related to a removed federal
claim may, in the exercise of its inherent authority, remand the state law
claim once the federal claim has been dismissed.28 9
281. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).
282. Wisc. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 392 (1998). Additionally, a court may
grant a remand after final judgment has been entered; see Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l Inc., 28
F.3d 269, 272-74 (2d Cir. 1994).
283. See Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (11 th Cir. 1999).
284. Id. at 1252.
285. 254 F.3d 1317 (11 th Cir. 2001).
286. Id. at 1320-21; see also In Re Bethesda Mem. Hosp., Inc., 123 F.3d 1407, 1410-11
(11 th Cir. 1997).
287. Whole Health Chiropractic, 254 F.3d at 1321.
288. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000).
289. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 348 (1988).
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e. Hearing
The district court may hold an evidentiary hearing on the remand mo-
tion, but if it is apparent from the face of the removal petition that the re-
moval is improper, the district court may dispense with the hearing.29 °
f. Remand Must Be to the State Court in Which the Case Originated
If the district court remands the case, it must remand it to the state court
in which it originated.2 9'
H. Attorneys'Fees
If remand is ordered, the district court has statutory authority to award
costs and any actual expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred as a result
of defendant's removal.292 The Middle District of Florida has expressed that
"the award of fees is completely discretionary .... ,29' A showing of bad
faith is no longer necessary as a predicate to the award of attorneys' fees,
thus fees may be awarded even where defendants acted in good faith in filing
a notice of removal.294
In Letner v. Unum Life Insurance Co., 295 the Northern District of Florida
awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees where defendant insurer, claiming preemp-
tion under ERISA, removed a breach of contract action in which plaintiff
employee was seeking to recover benefits under a long term disability pol-
icy.296 The court reasoned that the evidence clearly showed that the em-
ployee's plan was not an ERISA plan because her policy was separate from,
and had no relationship to, the group plan from the insurer, and the employer
did not sponsor her policy. 297
290. Wright v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 456 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (M.D. Fla. 1978) ("[A] hearing
may be necessary to determine if the allegations of the petition for removal are true.").
291. See Petrofsky v. ARA Group, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 85, 86 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).
293. IMCO USA, Inc. v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 729 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (M.D. Fla.
1990).
294. See Seminole County v. Pinter Enters., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1210 (M.D. Fla.
2000); Liebig v. DeJoy, 814 F. Supp. 1074, 1077 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding fees awarded
where "[n]otice was both untimely and improper since the federal court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction .... ).
295. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
296. Id. at 1302.
297. Id. at 1301.
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Incidentally, where a case is removed from state court, the Eleventh
Circuit has held that "Rule 11 does not apply to pleadings filed before re-
moval. '298 Therefore Rule 11 sanctions are unavailable for pre-removal mo-
tions or pleadings. Rule 11, "however, is applicable to papers filed in federal
court after removal. '299 Accordingly, Rule 11 sanctions "clearly apply to
frivolous motions to remand filed after removal."3 °
IV. REMOVAL ISSUES
A. Diversity - Establishing Amount in Controversy
Recently, courts have clarified the methods by which a defendant may
establish the amount in controversy.
1. When the Complaint Seeks Damages Exceeding $75,000
"[W]hen the complaint seeks damages exceeding $75,000, a removing
defendant may rely on the plaintiffs valuation of the case to establish the
amount in controversy unless it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff
cannot recover the amount claimed., 30 1 In such a case, it is generally not
difficult for a defendant to meet its burden of showing that subject matter
jurisdiction is present based on diversity, in part because where the plaintiff
-instituted the case in state court, there is a strong presumption that the
plaintiff has not claimed a large amount in order to confer jurisdiction on a
federal court or that the parties have colluded to that end." 302
2. Where a Plaintiff Fails to Specify the Total Amount of Damages
Demanded
Where a plaintiff fails to specify the total amount of damages de-
manded, defendant must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence.30 3 In Williams v. Best Buy Co.,3°4 the Eleventh Circuit recently
298. See Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 26 F.3d 1089, 1091 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (cit-
ing Griffin v. City of Oklahoma City, 3 F.3d 336, 339 (10th Cir. 1993)).
299. Worldwide Primates, Inc., 26 F.3d at 1091 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (c)).
300. Nutt v. Trynoski, No. 96-CV-96-MMP, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12823, at *5 (N.D.
Fla. Aug. 6, 1996).
301. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir.
2002) (citing Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1997)).
302. Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1315 (citing Singer, 116 F.3d at 375).
303. See Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11 th Cir. 2002); Sierminski v.
Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (1 1th Cir. 2000) ("Under any manner of proof, the
2004]
43
Lechner: Recent Trends in the Eleventh Circuit: Removal Jurisdiction and P
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA WREVIEW
clarified the standards district courts are to apply in determining whether the
jurisdictional amount is in controversy: 1) "[t]he district court may consider
whether it is 'facially apparent' from the complaint that the jurisdictional
amount is in controversy;" 2) if not facially apparent from the complaint,
"the court may consider facts in the removal petition;" and 3) the court may
consider post-removal evidence.3 °5
a. Facially Apparent from Complaint
In determining whether the case is removable based on the initial plead-
ing, courts will analyze all relief sought by the plaintiff, including but not
limited to, the amount of actual damages alleged. For example, in Viacom,
Inc. v. Zebe,3 °6 the court held that defendant's notice of removal, filed be-
yond thirty days from service of the complaint, was untimely.30 7 Although
plaintiff sought an indeterminate amount of damages, the value of the injunc-
tive relief sought was "clearly in excess of the minimum jurisdictional
amount.,
30 8
b. Facts in Removal Petition
If it is not "facially apparent" from the complaint that the jurisdictional
amount is in controversy, "the court may consider facts in the removal peti-
tion. 30 9  Indeed, "it is inappropriate for a district court to look only at a
plaintiffs complaint when considering its removal jurisdiction. '30 However,
a defendant cannot meet its burden with "conclusory allegation[s] in the no-
jurisdictional facts that support removal must be judged at the time of the removal, and any
post-petition affidavits are allowable only if relevant to that period of time.") (quoting Allen v.
R & H Oil & Gas Co., 65 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995)). See also Jackson v. Purdue
Pharma Co., No. 6:02-CV-1428-ORL-19KRS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6998, at *3-4 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 10, 2003); George v. Marriot Senior Living Services, Inc., No. 0-8707-CV-
HURLEY, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22822, at *5 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
304. 269 F.3d 1316 (11 th Cir. 2001).
305. Id. at 1319-20 (citing Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 949 (quoting Singer, 116 F.3d at 377
(in turn quoting Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335-36))) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
306. 882 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1065; see also Faulk v. Superior Indus. Int'l, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 457, 460 (M.D.
Fla. 1994) (holding that although the complaint stated that "this is an action for damages in
excess of fifteen thousand dollars," it was apparent from the face of the complaint that the
amount in controversy exceeded the minimum jurisdictional amount).
309. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.
310. Lewis v. AT& T Corp., 898 F. Supp. 907, 909 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
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tice of removal that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied, without setting
forth the underlying facts supporting such an assertion."3 1
Yet, courts have not generally required lengthy statements as to the un-
derlying facts. a 2 For example, in Lewis v. AT & T Corp.,3' 3 the Southern
District held that where the defendant alleged "that the amount in contro-
versy in this case exceeds $50,000.00 [pre-amendment] exclusive of interest
and costs," and the plaintiff did not challenge this allegation, but instead "as-
serts that Defendant must prove those facts by a preponderance of the evi-
dence," the defendant had satisfied its burden. 314 The court explained that
'if the notice affirmatively shows on its face the necessary jurisdic-
tional facts and these are not contradicted by the record, the mo-
tion to remand must challenge these allegations or they will be
deemed true. Thus a motion to remand which fails to put in issue
the averments of the notice of removal raises only the legal suffi-
ciency of the factual allegations, and the party seeking removal is
not required to fumish proof of the allegations.'315
c. Post Removal Evidence
The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that the "district court may prop-
erly consider post-removal evidence in determining whether the jurisdic-
tional amount was satisfied at the time of removal."'3 16 The Eleventh Circuit
has reasoned that "[w]hile it is undoubtedly best to include all relevant evi-
dence in the petition for removal and motion to remand, there is no good
reason to keep a district court from eliciting or reviewing evidence outside
311. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319-20.
312. See, e.g., Woolard v. Heyer-Schulte, 791 F. Supp. 294, 296 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(Allegations in the defendant's petition for removal, if not contradicted by the alle-
gations of the complaint, are alone sufficient to establish primafacie the existence
of federal jurisdiction. The mere fact that the plaintiff's complaint is silent as to
some fact necessary to establish federal jurisdiction, such as the amount in contro-
versy, does not preclude removal of a case by the defendant. Of course, as pointed
out above, if the plaintiff denies any material allegations contained in the petition
for removal, then the burden rests with the defendant to prove them.)
Id. (quoting Wright v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 456 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (M.D. Fla. 1978)).
313. 898 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
314. Id. at 909.
315. Id. at 909 (quoting from IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.168[4.-1] at 644-45).
See also Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, 329 F.3d 805, 808 (1 1th Cir. 2003)(stating the court will "give great deference to [a lawyer's representations as to amount of
damages and will] presume them to be true.").
316. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.
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the removal petition."3 7 Accordingly, the district court may '"require parties
to submit summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in con-
troversy at the time of removal.'
' 318
Because damages in employment law cases are often difficult to enu-
merate or substantiate, a continuing concern for removing employers is what
evidence may be used to establish that the amount in controversy has been
met. Courts have accepted the following forms of evidence in support of
removal.
i. Defendant's Declarations as to Damages
In Sierminski, a Florida Whistleblower Act case,
[a]fter removal but before the district court ruled on the motion for
remand .... defendant filed a response to plaintiffs motion in
which defendant attached a declaration from the company's Direc-
tor of Human Resources indicating plaintiffs salary and benefits
information. The motion itself contained detailed calculations in-
dicating that damages exceed the $50,000 jurisdictional amount.319
The district court denied plaintiff's motion to remand, in part because of
these declarations as to damages.32" The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, reason-
ing that the "[p]laintiff presented no evidence to contradict defendant's dam-
ages calculations. 32'
ii. Requests for Admissions
In Sierminski, "defendant sent plaintiff requests to admit that her claim
was not worth more" than the jurisdictional amount.322 Plaintiff failed to
respond to these requests within the time-frame provided in Rule 36 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.323 Defendant then "filed a motion to strike
or deny Plaintiffs motion to remand as moot after plaintiff failed to respond
317. Sierninski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945,949 (1lth Cir. 2000).
318. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 949 (quoting Singer v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Allen v. R & H
Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1995)))).
319. Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 942.
320. Id. at 949.
321. Id.
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to the requests" and the district court granted the motion. 4 In affirming, the
Eleventh Circuit considered the fact that plaintiff did not deny that the dam-
ages exceeded the jurisdictional amount when given the opportunity. 25 The
Eleventh Circuit held that, "[u]nder these circumstances, the district court
correctly determined that defendant carried its burden of establishing re-
moval jurisdiction. ' '12 6 Defendants may also attempt to obtain admissions or
damages breakdowns from a plaintiff prior to removal. Plaintiffs have ob-
jected to such discovery requests on the grounds of relevancy. In Sunrise
Mills ("MLP') Limited Partnership v. Adams,3 27 a Florida appellate court
held that a request for admission "'that you are seeking damages exclusive of
interest and costs in excess of $50,000"' was relevant and therefore quashed
the trial court's order sustaining plaintiffs objection that the request was
'not a material evidentiary issue in [this] case.', 328
3. Interrogatories
Post-removal interrogatories may be used to determine whether removal
jurisdiction was proper.32 9 For example, in Sierminski, the Eleventh Circuit
cited with approval the Seventh Circuit decision in Harmon v. OKI Sys-
tems ,33 in which "the district court relied upon post-removal answers to in-
terrogatories to determine whether removal jurisdiction was proper., 331
Additionally, courts have held that interrogatories issued prior to re-
moval may be used by a defendant to establish that the amount in contro-
versy requirement has been met and may form a basis for removing.332 For
324. Id.
325. Id. at 949.
326. Id.; see also Wilson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 782 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (find-
ing that plaintiff's response to defendant's requests for admission in which plaintiff admitted
that none of the named fictitious defendants existed triggered the thirty day period for re-
moval).
327. 688 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
328. Id. at 465.
329. Sierminski v.Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing
Harmon v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1997)).
330. 115 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997).
331. Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 949 (citing Harmon, 115 F.3d at 479-80).
332. See Field v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 8:00-CV-989-T-24TBM, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5451, at *20 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2001); Basso v. United Wis. Life Ins. Co., No. 97-573-CIV-
GRAHAM, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9996, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 1997); Viens v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 3:9602602, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24029 at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 1997)
(finding Defendant's removal action satisfied § 1446(b) because it was filed seventeen days
after receipt of plaintiffs responses to defendant's interrogatories); Wood v. Malin Trucking,
Inc., 937 F. Supp. 614, 616 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (holding that thirty day period for filing notice for
removal of negligence action began when trucking company received plaintiffs answers to
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example, in George v. Marriott Senior Living Services, Inc.,33 3 plaintiff as-
serted a claim for age discrimination under the FCRA and alleged her dam-
ages "'exceed Fifteen Thousand Dollars', but did not otherwise provide any
specific numerical calculation of damages . . . . ,,3 Defendant served inter-
rogatories, to which "plaintiff did not indicate the total amount of damages
sought, but provides a categorical breakdown of the damages and the meth-
ods that would be used to calculate them., 335 Defendant used this breakdown
as the basis for its calculations that the amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000.336 The court held defendant met its burden of proof.337
4. Post-Petition Affidavits
In Sierminski, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that post-petition affida-
vits could be considered by the district court. 3 8 This suggestion is consistent
with Williams v. Best Buy Co.,339 in which the Eleventh Circuit stated that
parties could "submit summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the
amount in controversy at the time of removal." 
3 40
interrogatories); Ellis v. Logan Co., 543 F. Supp. 586, 589 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (noting removal
petition timely filed by defendant pursuant to § 1446(b) when filed within thirty days of re-
ceipt of interrogatory answers); Miller v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 527 F. Supp. 775, 778 (D. Kan.
1981) (noting responses to defendant's interrogatories established for first time, since com-
plaint was filed, that damages sought were sufficient for removal); Fleming v. Colonial Stores,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 933, 934 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
333. No. 01-8707-CIV-HURLEY, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22822, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13,
2001).
334. Id. at *2.
335. Id. at *7.
336. Id.
337. Id. at *6-7.
338. Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 949 (citing Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326,
1335 (5th Cir. 1995)).
339. 269 F.3d 1316 (1 th Cir. 2001).
340. Id. at 1319 (quoting Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 949 (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (quoting Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326,
1335-36 (5th Cir. 1995)))); see also Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Bullard, 995 F.2d 1046, 1047
(1lth Cir. 1993) (ruling that an appraiser's affidavit regarding property valuation demon-
strated an appropriate amount in controversy existed); Fuller v. Exxon Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d
1289, 1295 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (stating "where it is not readily apparent from the face of the
complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum at the time of
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5. Initial Disclosures
A recent decision has held that plaintiffs initial disclosures may serve
as evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
amount.34'
6. Settlement Demands / Offers of Judgment
In Essenson v. Coale,342 the Middle District held that defendant's use of
plaintiff's offer of judgment figures as a basis for removal was proper.343 In
contrast, in Golden v. Dodge-Markham Co.,344 the Middle District held that
although defendant properly used plaintiffs settlement demand as notice that
the case could be removed, the settlement demand could not be used as evi-
dence that the amount in controversy was satisfied.345 The court, citing cases
standing for the proposition that settlement demands are frequently "mere
posturing", reasoned that plaintiffs settlement demand was not an honest
assessment of damages.346
7. Damages Routinely Awarded in Similar Cases
As evidence that more than 75,000 dollars was in controversy, a defen-
dant may provide evidence that damages in similar cases routinely approach
or exceed 75,000 dollars. 347 However, general blanket statements that dam-
ages could entitle the plaintiff to 75,000 dollars or more are unlikely to suf-
fice. 34
8
8. Plaintiffs Failure to Stipulate
In Golden, the middle district held that an employee's failure to stipu-
late as to damages was not evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded
the jurisdictional amount. 349 The Eleventh Circuit has agreed. 350 In Williams
341. See Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
342. 848 F. Supp. 987 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
343. Id. at 990.
344. 1 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
345. Id. at 1364-65.
346. Id. at 1364 (quoting Broderick v. Dellasandro, 859 F. Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Pa.
1994)).
347. Pease v. Medtronic, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
348. Golden, I F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
349. Id. at 1365.
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v. Best Buy Co. the Eleventh Circuit refused to accept plaintiff's refusals to
stipulate that her claims did not exceed 75,000 dollars as proof that the juris-
dictional amount in controversy was met. 35' The court explained that
"[t]here are several reasons why a plaintiff would not so stipulate, and a re-
fusal to stipulate standing alone does not satisfy Best Buy's burden of proof
on the jurisdictional issue. 352
9. Where a Plaintiff Has Specifically Claimed Less Than the Jurisdictional
Amount
Where a plaintiff has specifically claimed less than the jurisdictional
amount in state court, a defendant must prove to a "legal certainty" that the
plaintiff would not recover less than the jurisdictional amount if he or she
prevailed.3 53 Although "the defendant's burden of proof [is] . ..a heavy
one," 354 the Burns court made it clear that:
[a]dopting this standard does not mean that a removing defendant
can never prevail. A defendant could remain in federal court if he
showed that, if plaintiff prevails on liability, an award below the
jurisdictional amount would be outside the range of permissible




"[Every] civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed," "[e]xcept
as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress. ' 356 Congress has ex-
pressly prohibited removal of certain actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1445. 35,
Additionally, some courts have held that the Fair Labor Standards Act
350. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
351. Id. at 1320.
352. Id.
353. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1094, 1095 (1 th Cir. 1994) (citing St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Corp. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938)); Golden, 1 F. Supp. 2d
at 1362.
354. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.
355. Id. at 1096.
356. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
357. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (2000).
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("FLSA") and related statutes that proscribe removal based on language in
those statutes "may be maintained" in state court.358
a. 28 U.S.C. § 1445
In the United States Code Congress expressly proscribes removal of
four classes of actions: 1) claims "arising under the workmen's compensa-
tion laws" of the forum state; 2) claims arising under certain sections of the
Violence Against Women Act; 3) certain claims against railroads brought
under the Federal Employees' Liability Act; and 4) certain claims against
common carriers brought under the Jones Act.359
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the prohibition against removal of
claims arising under the workmen's compensation laws extends to retaliation
claims brought pursuant to state workers' compensation laws.360
b. FLSA - Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.
In 2003, the Supreme Court held that FLSA lawsuits brought in state
court are removable.36' Breuer addressed whether the language in the FLSA
that allows FLSA suits to "be maintained against any employer ... in any
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction," proscribed removal of such
cases.362 The Court held that this provision did not constitute an express pro-
hibition of removal as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).363
Prior to Breuer, the circuits were split on the issue.3' Breuer is signifi-
cant in that it also assures the removability of cases under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Employee Polygraph Pro-
358. See, e.g., Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1947).
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a)-(d).
360. Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1060 (11 th Cir. 2000).
361. Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1882, 1884 (2003).
362. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
363. Breuer, 123 S. Ct. at 1884.
364. Compare Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1997) (not removable),
with Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 292 F.3d 1308, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2002) (remov-
able). The Middle District of Florida was equally split. Compare Lemay v. Budget Rent A
Car Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 1448, 1450 (M.D. Fla. 1997) ("FLSA claims are not removable to
Federal court."), with Tucker v. Labor Leasing, Inc. 872 F. Supp. 941, 943 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
(permitting removal). The Southern District was equally split. Compare Valdivieso v. Atlas
Air, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (removable) and Hakim v. Sentry
Equip., Inc., No. 01-8359, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22881, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2001)
(same), with McHugh v. Elan Pharms., Inc., No. 01-6560-CIV, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22882
at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2001) (not removable) and Maranto v. Jenne, No. 00-7463-CIV
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21820 at *7-8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2000) (same).
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tection Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, all of which contain
similar "may be maintained" language.365
2. Issues Relating to Complete Preemption Removal
a. Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson
In Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,366 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the removability of state law usury claims on the ground of
preemption by the National Bank Act.367 The court found that two sections
of the Act
create a federal remedy for overcharges that is exclusive, even
when a state complainant ... relies entirely on state law. Because
§§ 85 and 86 provide the exclusive cause of action for such claims, there
is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a
national bank.368
The Court reasoned that "the same federal interest that protected na-
tional banks from the state taxation" (e.g. "power to destroy") in McCulloch
v. Maryland69 supported the interpretation of the National Bank Act that
gives its provisions the "requisite pre-emptive force to provide removal ju-
risdiction. 37°
Anderson is significant because it potentially expands the scope of the
complete preemption doctrine.37' Prior to Anderson, the Court was very hesi-
tant to expand this exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.372 However,
in Anderson, the Court suggested that a federal statute is completely preemp-
tive when "it provid[es] the exclusive cause of action for the claim asserted.
",373 This definition is closer to that of "ordinary preemption," and as Justice
Scalia noted in his dissent, finds no basis in the Court's precedent in this
area.3 74 Accordingly, defendants may be able to use Anderson as a basis for
365. Breuer, 123 S. Ct. at 1887.
366. 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003).
367. Id. at 2060.
368. Id. at 2064.
369. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
370. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. at 2064
371. See id.
372. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
373. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. at 2063.
374. Id. at 2067 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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removing pursuant to "complete preemption," where before only "ordinary
preemption" would have existed.
Subsequently, in Brocato v. Angelo Brocato Ice Cream & Confection-
ery, Inc. 37 5 a district court, citing Anderson, held that plaintiffs state law
trademark claims were completely preempted by the Lanham Act, in part
because "the only way [p]laintiffs can obtain the certainty they seek is by
having a court determine [d]efendant's rights under its federal trade-
marks.
376
b. Complete Preemption Under ERISA
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has extended the
complete preemption doctrine to cases implicating ERISA, the mere invoca-
tion of ERISA preemption does not automatically make a nonremovable case
removable. Rather, in order for a claim to be completely preempted under
ERISA section 502(a) (ERISA's civil enforcement provision): 1) "there
must be a relevant ERISA plan[;]" 2) "the plaintiff must have standing under
that plan;" 3) "the defendant must be an ERISA entity;" and 4) "the com-
plaint must seek compensatory relief akin to that available under section
1132(a); often this will be a claim for benefits due under a plan., 377 A re-
moval based on "ERISA complete preemption" where these elements are
lacking may result in an award of fees to plaintiff.37
i. Must Be an ERISA Plan
Under the first element, if the benefit plan at issue in the case does not
constitute an ERISA plan, preemption will not exist, as there will be no fed-
eral question or removal jurisdiction.379 Therefore, remand determinations
will sometimes involve substantive inquiries into whether an ERISA plan
exists. For example, in Stern v. IBM,380 IBM discontinued paying an em-
ployee benefits under its "'Sickness and Accident Income Plan', which pro-
vide[d] up to 52 weeks of an employee's 'regular salary' when he is unable
375. No. 03-1316, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12770, at * 1 (E.D. La. July 22, 2003).
376. Id. at *9. But see In re Wal-Mart Employee Litig., No. 03-C-0503, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS * 12075, at 8, 11 (E.D. Wis. June 30, 2003) (awarding fees and costs to plaintiff where
defendant attempted to argue that the FLSA completely preempted state wage and hour
claims).
377. Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1212 (1 th Cir. 1999).
378. Letner v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 203. F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
379. Stem v. Int'l Bus. Mach., Corp., 326 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 2003), reh'g, en
banc, denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17633 (1 1th Cir. June 10, 2003).
380. Id. at 1369.
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to work due to sickness or an accident. '38' The employee sued in state court
for breach of his employment agreement.38 2 IBM removed based upon its
argument that its program was an ERISA "welfare benefit plan. 3 83  The
Eleventh Circuit held that because defendant's program was a payroll prac-
tice that was exempted by regulation from ERISA, the doctrine of complete
preemption was inapplicable and no federal question jurisdiction existed,
therefore removal was improper.
3 84
ii. Plaintiff Must Have Standing
As to the second element, the plaintiff must have standing for there to
be complete preemption.385 Thus, preemption depends not only on the nature
of the claim, but the party bringing it. Generally, the plaintiff must be a
beneficiary or fiduciary of an ERISA plan.386 In Hobbs v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Alabama, 387 the Eleventh Circuit ordered the remand of a case
brought by physicians' assistants seeking payment for services on the basis
of lack of standing, despite the fact that the assistants would have had stand-
ing under Eleventh Circuit law had they held valid assignments of benefits.
388
In Pederson v. Country Life Insurance Co.,38 9 the Ninth Circuit dismissed an
appeal of a remand order, holding that the district court's determination that
the plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than an employee with
standing to sue was an appropriate decision to make so that the court could
determine its jurisdiction under ERISA.39°
381. Id. at 1369.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Stern. 326 F.3d at 1374. See also Thomas v. Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (explaining "Florida Statutes death statute
interfere with the operation of an employee benefit plan to the extent that it may preclude
operation of a reimbursement provision interpreted under an ERISA regulated employee bene-
fit contract. Such an interference will provide federal question jurisdiction, under the ERISA
complete preemption doctrine...."). Id.
385. Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11 th Cir. 1998).
386. Id. at 1351; Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., No. 02-2137, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 15285, at *20 (4th Cir. July 31, 2003) (holding "Sonoco is not asserting the
breach of contract claims in its fiduciary capacity, but rather is seeking to enforce its own
rights under the Contract ... Sonoco has no standing to assert the breach of contract claims
under § 502(a)(3); those claims are not completely preempted .....
387. 276 F.3d 1236 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
388. Id. at 1240-43.
389. No. 00-15205, 2001 WL 20923, at *1 (9th Cir. July 19, 2001).
390. Id.; See also Ward v. Alternative Health Delivery Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 624, 627 (6th
Cir. 2001) (concluding that despite the existence of an ERISA claim at the time of removal,
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iii. Defendant Must Be an ERISA Entity
There is no preemption at all, not even defensive preemption, when the
defendant is "a non-ERISA entity" and the claims do not "affect relations
among principal ERISA entities as such ....
iv. Must Seek Relief Akin to ERISA
Under the fourth element, "[s]tate law claims are completely preempted
by ERISA, and thus removable to federal court as federal claims," if they
state a claim seeking the relief "akin to" that provided for in section
1132(a).392 Section 1132(a)(1)(B) permits a civil action by a participant or
beneficiary "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan ....
Under this test, "[n]ot all state law claims are completely preempted and
may be subject to ERISA defensive preemption only., 394 For example, in
Ervast v. Flexible Products Co., the plaintiff claimed that his employer
breached its corporate fiduciary duty to communicate material information
relating to an undisclosed merger to him as a shareholder through the com-
pany ESOP plan, and that as a result he was entitled to the difference in the
price he received for his ESOP shares and post-merger announcement price
of the shares. 395 The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's state law
claims for breach of corporate fiduciary duty were not completely preempted
by ERISA and therefore not removable on that basis.396 The court reasoned
that the plaintiff did not contest his distribution under the terms of the ESOP,
but rather claimed "a right to information that, if he possessed, would have
changed his decision making process with regard to the time he sought to
collect his benefits. 397
the district court lost jurisdiction once it determined on ruling on a motion to dismiss that the
plaintiff lacked standing to bring an ERISA claim).
391. Morstein v. Nat'l Ins. Servs., Inc., 93 F.3d 715, 722 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (find-
ing independent insurance agent and his agency not ERISA entities); See also Franklin v.
QHG of Gadsden, Inc., 127 F.3d 1024, 1029 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
392. See Ervast v. Flexible Prods. Co., No. 02-15769, 02-15941, 2003 WL 22203472, at
*4 (1 1th Cir. Sept. 24, 2003).
393. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
394. Ervast, 2003 WL 22203472, at *5.
395. Id.
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Likewise, where a plaintiffs state law claims relate to the provision of
inadequate services or substandard treatment, as opposed to the denial of
benefits under an ERISA health care plan, removal under the complete pre-
emption doctrine is improper.398 In contrast, in Krasny v. Waser,399 the Mid-
dle District held that where a plaintiff's medical malpractice claims included
allegations of denial of benefits due under an ERISA plan-and not solely
substandard medical treatment-the plaintiff "asserted claims for relief that
is 'akin to' the relief available under 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(a) 'to recover benefits
due ... under the terms of [the] plan,"' and therefore such claims were com-
pletely preempted and removal was proper.
Finally, the complete preemption doctrine will not support removal
where Congress has the power to completely eliminate certain remedies by
preempting state actions, while providing no substitute federal action. In
such cases "preemption serves only as a federal defense, the barred claims
are not completely preempted, and thus not removable to federal court."''4
For example, in King v. Marriott International, Inc., an employee alleged
"that she was discharged for complaining about and refusing to violate"
ERISA. 42 The Fourth Circuit held that the employee's state wrongful dis-
charge claim was not removable, because none of the employee's actions
were "protected under section 510 [of ERISA], the only potentially relevant
provision.' '4°3 The only portion of that provision that possibly applied was
the sentence barring discharge of any person, because he gave information or
was about to testify in an inquiry or proceeding relating to the pertinent chap-
ter of ERISA. 404 However, there was no allegation that the employee testi-
fied in any proceeding or was about to do so. 40 5 Consequently, her wrongful
discharge claim is not completely preempted, and removal of her claim was
inappropriate.40 6
398. Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) (where plaintiff requested
relief for the consequences of U.S. Healthcare's provision of inadequate services and not for
the denial of benefits under his health care plan, claim fell outside the scope of ERISA's com-
plete preemption clause and therefore, removal on the basis of complete preemption was im-
proper), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 930 (2001).
399. 147 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
400. Id. at 1308.
401. King v, Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir., 2003).
402. Id. at 423.
403. Id. at 428.
404. Id. at 427.
405. Id.
406. King, 337 F.3d at 428.
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C. Fraudulent Joinder - Defeating Fraudulent Joinder in Diversity Cases
To remove on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship
among the parties must be complete (e.g., only if there is no plaintiff and no
defendant who are citizens of the same state). °7 Consequently, a defendant
cannot remove a case that contains some claims against "diverse" defendants
as long as there is one claim brought against a "non-diverse" defendant.4 8
Therefore, plaintiffs will sometimes name nondiverse defendants in an effort
to preclude removal. Accordingly, courts have recognized that "[a] party
who has been 'fraudulently joined,' however, may be disregarded for pur-
poses of determining whether there is diversity.'49
In defeating "'fraudulent joinder, the removing party has the burden of
proving that either: (1) there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a
cause of action against the resident defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has fraudu-
lently pled jurisdictional facts to bring the resident defendant into state
court.'
4 10
Under this test, when considering whether a defendant has been fraudu-
lently joined on a motion for remand, "'federal courts are not to weigh the
merits of a plaintiffs claim beyond determining whether it is an arguable one
under state law.""'41 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that when
there are one or more defendants from the forum state whose presence if
proper would defeat removal, then "[i]f there is even a possibility that a state
court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one
of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was
proper and remand the case to the state court., 41 2 Moreover, a plaintiff's
motivation for joining a defendant is irrelevant as long as the plaintiff has a
407. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990). But cf FED. R. Civ. P. 21;
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989) (Rule 21 authorizes courts
to dismiss nondiverse defendants in order to cure jurisdictional defects, instead of the entire
case).
408. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
409. Bouie v. Am. Gen. Life and Accident Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1262 (N.D. Fla.
2002).
410. Pacheo de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (citing Crowe
v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11 th Cir. 1997)).
411. Id. See also Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding
"there must be a reasonable possibility of recovery, not merely a theoretical one").
412. Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (1 1th Cir. 1983), superseded by
statute on other grounds as noted in Wilson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 782 (11 th
Cir. 1989); see also Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 253 F.3d 1302, 1305 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
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colorable claim, and intends to obtain (as opposed to collect on) a judgment,
against that defendant." 3
D. Eleventh Amendment
By removing a case to federal court, the state waives its eleventh
amendment immunity.4t 4 A state may not claim eleventh amendment immu-
nity after it voluntarily removes to federal court a sexual harassment lawsuit
involving state claims in which it has consented to be sued.
V. APPEAL
As a general rule, an appellate court may not review a district court's
order remanding a case back to state court. 415  There are, however, two
widely recognized exceptions to this rule: the Thermtron Products excep-
tion; and the "matter of substantive law" exception.416 Moreover, remands
based upon procedural defects in the removal ordered sua sponte by a district
court are reviewable. 7
A. The Thermtron Products Exception
The Supreme Court held that only remands based on grounds specified
in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) are insulated from review under 28 U.S.C. §
1447(d).418 Therefore, courts of appeal have jurisdiction over an appeal from
a district court's discretionary decisions to remand that are not based on lack
of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in the removal procedure.419
413. Samples v. Conoco, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1319 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Triggs
v. John Crump Toyota, Inc. 154 F.3d 1284, 1291 (1 th Cir. 1998).
414. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002).
415. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000); New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092,
1096 (1 1th Cir. 1997) ("Cases remanded for lack of jurisdiction are immune from review even
if the district court's decision is clearly erroneous.").
416. Sammie Bonner Constr. Co. v. W. Star Trucks Sales, Inc., 330 F.3d 1308, 1311 (1 1th
Cir. 2003).
417. Velchez v. Carnival Corp., 331 F.3d 1207, 1209(1lth Cir. 2003).
418. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976).
419. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1996); Hernandez v.
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B. The "Matter of Substantive Law" Exception
"[T]he 'matter of substantive law exception,' allows the courts of ap-
peals to review those remands to state court that are based on determinations
of the substantive rights of the parties., 420 However, the 'matter of substan-
tive law exception"' does not apply "when 'the substantive issue is intrinsic
to the district court's decision to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.""'42 "Thus, when a district court rules on a matter of substantive law
that must be resolved to determine whether the court has jurisdiction over the
case, [the appellate court] may not review the court's ruling on that issue
even if it is erroneous.,
422
C. Sua Sponte Remands Based on Procedural Defects
Remands based upon procedural defects in the removal ordered sua
sponte by a district court are not permitted and therefore, are reviewable.423
However, a remand order based upon a procedural defect, different from the
one asserted in the remand motion filed by a party, does not amount to a sua
sponte order over which appellate jurisdiction exists.4 24
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent increase in state legislation relating to employment-related
matters has brought about an upsurge in employment lawsuits filed in state
courts. Employers often perceive federal courts as more experienced and
neutral in employment law issues and generally benefit by removing such
cases to federal court. Recent decisions have set forth guidance and stan-
dards to which employers' counsel should adhere when attempting to re-
move. Failure to do so may result in remand back to state court.
420. Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1285 (1lth
Cir. 1999).
421. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, 929
F.2d 599, 602 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
422. Sammie Bonner Constr. Co., 330 F.3d at 1311 (issue of whether plaintiff was entitled
to attorneys' fees therefore "intrinsic to the jurisdictional question" and is, consequently,
unreviewable on appeal).
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